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Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and 
Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits  
LEO M. ROMERO 
This Article addresses the timely and controversial topic of constitutional limits on 
punitive damages and brings a criminal punishment theory perspective to the analysis of 
this issue.  The question of how to determine when punishment is unconstitutionally 
excessive has been and continues to be a subject of intense debate in the courts and 
scholarly circles.  The United States Supreme Court has subjected criminal sanctions, 
criminal forfeitures, and punitive damages to a proportionality requirement, but the Court 
uses different approaches to the proportionality analysis depending on the type of 
punishment.  In the criminal context, the Court has retreated in large part from 
proportionality review, deferring to legislative maxima for criminal sentences.  By contrast, 
where there is no legislative cap on the punitive damages a jury can award, the Court has 
undertaken a more active role in determining the proportionality of punitive damages.  
Similarly, where there is no legislative limit to the amount of property that can be forfeited, 
the Court has engaged in a more active proportionality review.  An analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s different proportionality reviews demonstrates that the different approaches are 
explained by the presence or absence of legislative limits on punishment. 
This Article examines the nature of punishment and the requirements for just 
punishment—notice, proportionality, and limits—and applies these principles to punitive 
damages. It concludes that a system that imposes no limits on the amount of punitive 
damages awards contravenes the principle of notice and leaves courts with little guidance 
in assessing the excessiveness of particular awards. To bring punitive damages into 
conformity with the principles of just punishment and to provide courts with a benchmark 
for evaluating the proportionality of punitive damages awards, the Article concludes with 
proposals for legislative limits on such awards.  Because of the importance of limits on 
punishment, including punitive damages, this Article suggests how states can impose caps 
on punitive damages awards that serve the policy interests of punishing and deterring 
wrongful and harmful conduct, and how states can use caps to justify large awards in 
appropriate cases that will survive excessiveness challenges. 
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Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and 
Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits 
LEO M. ROMERO∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether punitive damages awards are constitutionally 
excessive remains a controversial topic.  The United States Supreme Court 
continues to review punitive damages awards to determine whether they 
comport with due process, vacating in 2007 a punitive damages award of 
$79.5 million against a tobacco company, Philip Morris USA,1 and in the 
2008 Term reducing to $507 million a $2.5 billion award against Exxon 
Shipping Co. for an oil spill by the tanker, Exxon Valdez.2  Despite the 
efforts of the Supreme Court to formulate adequate criteria for determining 
when punitive damages awards are disproportional to the punishable 
conduct and therefore excessive,3 the issue of limits on punitive damages, 
whether constitutional or as a matter of common law excessiveness,4 
continues to be a subject of intense debate in the courts and scholarly 
circles. 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, finding a punitive damages award 
excessive under the Due Process Clause, spawned considerable scholarly 
comment on punitive damages.  The articles cover a range of topics that 
examine punitive damages from a variety of perspectives, including 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Interim Dean and Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.  I wish to thank 
Professors Norman C. Bay and G. Emlen Hall for their helpful comments and Dean Suellyn 
Scarnecchia of the University of New Mexico School of Law for her support of this project.  Reference 
librarians, Barbara Lah and Alexandra Siek, who assisted me in finding and organizing the 
considerable volume of materials on this subject, deserve special thanks. 
1 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007).  The Court did not decide 
whether the award was excessive but decided only that the Due Process Clause prohibits a punitive 
damages award from “punish[ing] a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties.”  Id. at 1063.  
The Court then vacated the award on grounds that the jury instruction did not protect the defendant 
from the possibility of being punished for injuries to nonparties.  Id. at 1064–65. 
2 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 42 (U.S. June 25, 2008).  The jury 
awarded $5 billion against Exxon, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reduced it to $2.5 
billion.  In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1068 (2007).  
3 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418–28 (2003); BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–86 (1996).  See infra Section IV for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s efforts to develop guideposts for assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. 
4 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co., No. 07-219, slip. op. at 28. 
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empirical,5 policy,6 historical,7 and constitutional.8  Only a handful, 
however, have looked at punitive damages from the perspective of criminal 
theory—comparing punitive damages to other forms of punishment.9  Most 
                                                                                                                          
5 For empirical perspectives of punitive damages, see, for example, Denise E. Antolini, Punitive 
Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis of Punitive Damages Judgments in 
Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143 (2004); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: 
How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004); Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations 
and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1359 (2004); W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1405 (2004).  For other empirical studies published before the decision in the State Farm case, see 
generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 
(2002); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 
(1997); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications 
for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002); Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries 
in Florida in Terrorem and in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2001).  For book reviews of 
Sunstein, see Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 
(2003); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381 (2003). 
6 For articles criticizing punitive damages, see, for example, Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive 
Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429 (2004); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. 
Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984); 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 
(2003).  For articles supporting punitive damages, see, for example, Marc Galanter & David Luban, 
Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993); David F. 
Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781 (1996); Michael L. Rustad, Happy 
No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. 
REV. 461 (2005); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1297 (2005) [hereinafter Rustad, Iron Cage]; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as 
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Paul J. Zwier, The Utility of a Nonconsequentialist 
Rationale for Civil-Jury-Awarded Punitive Damages, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 403 (2006). 
7 See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1146–52 (2006) (chronicling the 
punitive damages cases decided by the Rehnquist Court to reflect the Court’s hostility toward litigation 
and distrust of the ability of litigation to ensure corporate compliance with legal and ethical 
requirements). 
8 For a constitutional analysis of punitive damages, see, for example, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A 
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Martin H. Redish 
& Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004). 
9 For comparative studies of punitive damages, see, for example, Barry L. Johnson, Purging the 
Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits 
on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461 (2000); Pamela S. Karlan, 
“Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 880 (2004); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death is Different,” Is Money Different?  Criminal 
Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages—Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing 
Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217 (2003); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme 
Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal 
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249 (2000).  One article 
proposes using guidelines similar to the federal sentencing guidelines for determining the dollar amount 
of punitive damages.  Jenny Miao Jiang, Comment, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of Federal 
Intervention, Constitutionalization, and Substantive Due Process in Punitive Damages Law, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 793, 813–21 (2006).  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
105 (2005), for an interesting attempt to divide punitive damages into civil and criminal aspects based 
on whether punitive damages reflect a plaintiff’s right to be punitive (civil) or reflect society’s need to 
punish (criminal).  The distinction would determine whether constitutional protections, including 
scrutiny for excessiveness, would apply.  According to Professor Zipursky, punitive damage awards 
regarded as reflecting the plaintiff’s right to be punitive would not be subject to excessiveness review.  
Id. at 167–68. 
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of these articles lament the fact that the Supreme Court appears to apply a 
more stringent review of punitive damages awards for excessiveness than it 
does of criminal sentences.10  Others attempt to explain the proportionality 
jurisprudence of the Court in addressing punitive damages, criminal 
sanctions, and forfeitures.11  Some articles avoid the proportionality issue 
by attempting to describe punitive damages as a type of compensation for 
losses not covered by compensatory damages. 
This Article views punitive damages as pure punishment and not 
compensatory.12  It therefore builds on proportionality studies involving 
different types of punishment and analyzes punitive damages through the 
prism of criminal punishment theory.13  It examines the nature of 
punishment and the requirements for just punishment—notice, 
proportionality, and limits—and applies these principles to punitive 
damages.  It concludes that a system that imposes no limits on the amount 
of punitive damages awards contravenes the principle of notice and leaves 
courts with little guidance in assessing the excessiveness of particular 
awards.  To bring punitive damages into conformity with the principles of 
just punishment and to provide courts with a benchmark for evaluating the 
proportionality of punitive damages awards, this Article proposes 
legislative limits on such awards. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, the Constitution 
requires that punishment in its various forms—imprisonment, fines, 
forfeiture, and punitive damages—be proportional to the wrongful conduct 
that justifies punishment.  The Court finds the constitutional sources of the 
proportionality requirement in the Excessive Fines Clause14 (fines and 
                                                                                                                          
10 See James Headley, Proportionality Between Crimes, Offenses, and Punishments, 17 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 247 (2004); Gershowitz, supra note 9, at 1276.  See also Van Cleave, supra note 9, at 
222, for commentary chiding the Supreme Court’s handling of punitive damages differently than 
criminal sentences. 
11 For further commentary of the Court’s punitive damage proportional analysis, see, for example, 
Gershowitz, supra note 9; Karlan, supra note 9. 
12 The United States Supreme Court, likewise, views punitive damages as separate from 
compensatory damages and aimed solely at punishing the defendant.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
No. 07-219, slip. op. at 18–19 (U.S. June 25, 2008).   
13 An evaluation of the Court’s procedural requirements for awarding punitive damages is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007) 
(concerning a harm-to-others instruction that failed to protect a defendant’s due process rights); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) (requiring jury instruction prohibiting 
the use of defendant’s out-of-state conduct to punish the defendant); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (concerning proper standard of review on appeal); Honda 
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 419 (1994) (addressing post-verdict review); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1991) (concerning jury instructions).  For due process analysis of 
punitive damages, see generally Anthony J. Fanze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on 
Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 425, 427–30 
(2004); Anthony J. Fanze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due 
Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423 (forthcoming 2008).  
14 U.S. Const. amend. VIII; United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 
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forfeitures), the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause15 (imprisonment 
terms and the death penalty), and the Due Process Clause16 (punitive 
damages). 
In addition to constitutional limits, the Court has imposed an 
excessiveness limitation on punitive damages in federal maritime cases.  
Exercising its common law authority to regulate federal damages in the 
absence of a statute, the Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker adopted a 
limit on punitive damages equal to the amount of compensatory 
damages—a 1:1 ratio cap.17  The Court arrived at this limit by looking at 
ways in which states regulate punitive damages awards for excessiveness 
and settled on a ratio between compensatory and punitived damages as the 
most promising basis for setting a cap on punitive damages.18  After 
reviewing different ratio caps adopted by states19 and empirical studies 
showing the median ratio of punitive to compensatory damages to be about 
0.65:1, the Court adopted a ratio cap of 1:1 as the limit on punitive 
damages in federal maritime cases.20  
In its review of the proportionality of punishment, the United States 
Supreme Court treats legislatively limited punishment differently than ad 
hoc punishment.21  In the area of criminal prison sentences, the Court for 
the most part defers to the legislative determinations regarding the proper 
amount of punishment and finds a sentence within the legislative 
maximum excessive in only the rarest of cases.  In the area of punitive 
damages, where there is no legislative limit on the size of awards, the 
Court has shown little deference to the jury’s determination and instead has 
engaged in a search for guideposts to assess the proportionality of the 
                                                                                                                          
15 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality 
opinion) (utilizing the modified proportionality test adopted in Harmelin by Justice Kennedy); 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that the 
proportionality principle of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause is narrow); Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (noting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause prohibits “sentences that 
are disproportionate to the crime committed.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (“This Court has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a 
sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”). 
16 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.  See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (“While States possess 
discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural and 
substantive constitutional limitations on these awards.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”) 
(citations omitted); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (“Perhaps the most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct.”). 
17 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 40 (U.S. June 25, 2008).   
18 Id. at 33. 
19 Id. at 37. 
20 Id. at 40. 
21 Compare, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (relying on principles that substantially defer to the legislative determination of 
proportional punishment), with State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (engaging 
in a strict review of punitive damages, applying guideposts to determine whether the punitive damages 
award was excessive). 
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award.22  Similarly, in evaluating forfeitures for excessiveness, the Court, 
in the absence of legislative limits, has looked to other referents to 
determine whether the value of property forfeited is proportional to the 
misconduct.23  
Courts, however, have difficulty formulating adequate criteria to judge 
the proportionality of punitive damages awards.  Courts lack the 
institutional competence to make what in essence amounts to policy 
decisions.24  Legislatures, on the other hand, do make policy.  They make 
judgments that reflect the understanding of the community.  In addition, 
legislative judgments on the permissible amount of punitive damages 
provide fair notice to potential wrongdoers and prevent gross disparities in 
awards. 
From moral, rule of law, and constitutional perspectives, punishment 
requires an upper limit, preferably established by a legislative body.  Legal 
punishment is the prerogative of the state, and punishment, to be legitimate 
in a democratic society, must be authorized and limited by the state in the 
form of legislative enactment.  The legislature, representing society’s 
judgments, must both define the conduct that deserves punishment and 
determine the limits of that punishment.25  The requirement of limits on 
punishment applies to all types of punishment, including punitive 
damages.26  Criminal sanctions, as set forth in criminal codes, reflect 
society’s judgment as to the proportionality of punishment to wrongful 
conduct.27 
                                                                                                                          
22 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996) (adopting the following 
guideposts: degree of reprehensibility, ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and 
sanctions for comparable conduct); see also infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338–39 (1998) (determining whether the 
forfeiture amount was excessive by looking at the degree of gravity of the conduct and the authorized 
imprisonment and fine sanctions for comparable conduct); see also infra notes 274–82 and 
accompanying text. 
24 Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg believe that Congress, rather than the Court, should make 
the policy judgments regarding limits on punitive damages.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, 
slip. op. at 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
25 See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our 
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will 
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”). 
26 In addition, punishment in any form requires the extra procedural protections provided by the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social 
Effects Theory, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 693 (2006) (“[W]here the state authorizes or enforces 
sanctions having either a systematically deterrent or systematically retributive social effect, the 
potential threat posed to civil rights always justifies affording [enhanced procedural protections] to 
suspects or defendants.”).  Professor Fellmeth’s requirement of enhanced procedural protections should 
include notice of the limits on punishment. 
27 In the area of criminal sanctions, including both imprisonment and fines, states and the federal 
government have criminal codes that define criminal conduct and establish the authorized punishment 
for violations.  For examples of statutes defining criminal offenses, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-2725 (2008), 
Cal. Penal Code §§ 1-15003 (West 2008), N.Y. Penal Law §§ 1.00–500.10 (McKinney 2008), and 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 101-9352 (West 2008).  These codes give notice as to the prohibited conduct 
and set forth the maximum punishment for different crimes based on the relative wrongfulness of the 
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Punitive damages, however, punish without a societal judgment about 
proportionality in the many states that have no legislatively imposed 
limits.28  Nineteen states have enacted caps of different forms,29 including 
statutes that cap punitive damages as a fixed dollar amount,30 as a fixed 
ratio to the amount of compensatory damages,31 as a fixed ratio subject to a 
dollar limit,32 and as a dollar limit based on the income, profit from 
misconduct, or net worth of the defendant.33  Apart from the states that 
have imposed legislative caps and the six states that do not recognize 
punitive damages, there is no legislative judgment as to proportionality of 
punishment to wrongful conduct.  Juries have virtually unlimited discretion 
to determine the amount of money the defendant deserves to pay for the 
wrongful conduct.34 
Jury determinations of the amount of punitive damages in a particular 
case differ significantly from legislative limits.  Jury determinations are ad 
hoc based on the particulars of specific cases, which include facts about the 
plaintiff and the injuries suffered, the defendant, and the conduct involved.  
                                                                                                                          
crimes.  Not everyone agrees that criminal codes reflect proportional punishment.  See Stephen F. 
Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 882 (2005) (blaming courts’ 
willingness to interpret federal statutes broadly on forcing “federal criminal law . . . out of kilter with 
any sense of moral proportion” and causing “all crimes, both serious and trivial, [to be] punished with 
remarkable severity”).  Modern criminal codes grade the seriousness of criminal offenses and authorize 
different punishments depending on the seriousness of the offenses.  The adoption of sentencing 
guidelines in some jurisdictions reflects an effort to measure more precisely the amount of punishment 
based on the seriousness of the crime and to insure consistency and uniformity in punishment.  See, 
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2006) 1 (detailing the function of the sentencing 
guidelines); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2005) (“The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to 
establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that 
sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction 
and the extent of the offender’s criminal history.”). 
28 Similarly, forfeitures have no legislative limits.  In the case of forfeiture of property used in a 
crime, there is no legislative limit on the value of the property subject to forfeiture or any legislative 
determination that measures the value of the property forfeited to the seriousness of the crime 
committed.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2008) (mandating forfeiture of the property used in the 
offense with no dollar limit).  As a result, the value of the property forfeited may exceed any fine 
authorized for commission of the crime.  See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 n.14 
(1998) (valuing the property subject to forfeiture at $354,144, whereas the maximum fine was 
$250,000). 
29 See Rustad, Iron Cage, supra note 6, at 1339–46 (illustrating a useful chart listing the states 
with caps on punitive damages). 
30 Id. at 1346; see, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (West 2008) (capping punitive damage awards 
at $350,000 with no exceptions). 
31 Rustad, Iron Cage, supra note 6, at 1347; see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 13-21-102(1)(a) 
(West 2008) (limiting punitive damage awards to a one-to-one ratio with actual damages awarded). 
32 Rustad, Iron Cage, supra note 6, at 1347; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73(1)(a)(1-2) (West 
2008) (limiting punitive damages to three times the amount of compensatory damages, but not 
exceeding $500,000). 
33 Rustad, Iron Cage, supra note 6, at 1348; see, e.g., Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 60-3701(e)–(f) 
(West 2008) (limiting punitive damages to the lesser of the annual gross income earned by the 
defendant or $5,000,000). 
34 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 883 (contrasting the statutory boundaries imposed on juries in 
criminal cases to authorized particular punishments; jury “determination[s] of punitive damages 
amounts is so much less constrained”). 
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In addition, juries in punitive damage cases do not consider, like a 
legislative body, the range of wrongful conduct that deserves punishment 
or the measure of punishment that ought to apply to different degrees of 
wrongfulness.  As a result, a jury can make an ad hoc punitive award that 
can differ substantially from another jury’s award for similar misconduct.  
Such ad hoc and different determinations of punitive damages by juries do 
not, therefore, represent broad societal judgments about the right 
proportion of punishment to bad behavior. 
A system permitting punitive damages awards to be set in any amount 
without limit violates two principles of legality.  First, defendants do not 
have sufficient notice of the consequences for their conduct.  They do not 
know how much punishment a particular jury will impose.35  Knowing that 
there is no limit to the dollar amount a jury may award hardly satisfies 
notice sufficient to satisfy due process concerns.36  Second, the absence of 
limits on punitive damages allows for wide disparity in awards for 
defendants by different juries.  In fact, the same misconduct has produced 
very different punitive damages awards in two cases against a tobacco 
manufacturer, Philip Morris Inc., involving essentially identical claims and 
evidence.  In the California case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $50 million 
in punitive damages,37 whereas in the Oregon case, a different jury 
returned a verdict of $79.5 million.38  Although a limit on punitive 
damages awards would not eliminate disparity in awards, a limit would 
reduce disparity to the extent that no awards could exceed the limit. 
To produce more uniform punitive damages awards, and to make 
awards for similar misconduct more equal, misconduct justifying punitive 
damages should be graded like crimes and assigned different dollar 
limits.39  Limits on punitive damages—whether a single cap, multiple 
limits based on categories of misconduct, or narrowly defined limits based 
on guidelines—would provide notice of allowable punishment and produce 
more uniformity than an open-ended system of punitive damages.  In 
addition, limits based on categories or guidelines would bring punishment 
                                                                                                                          
35 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 29 (U.S. June 25, 2008).   
36 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of 
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only 
of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State 
may impose.”); id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that basic notions of 
fairness require notice of the severity of a penalty and assurance of uniform general punishment for 
those similarly situated). 
37 Henley v. Philip Morris Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
38 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061, 1063 (2007) (opting not to decide 
whether the award was “grossly excessive,” but deciding only that the Due Process Clause prohibits a 
punitive damages award from “punish[ing] a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties”). 
39 It has been suggested that even more uniformity could be achieved by adopting punitive 
damages guidelines similar to the federal sentencing guidelines used to determine the appropriate 
prison sentence for criminal violations.  See Jiang, supra note 9, at 813–17 (proposing punitive 
damages guidelines modeled on the grid system in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
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more in line with the nature of the misconduct. 
Legislative limits on punitive damages will also assist courts in 
assessing an award for excessiveness.  Proportionality of punishment to an 
offense involves two judgments—how serious is the offense and how 
much punishment does it deserve.  In the case of criminal punishment, 
legislatures make these judgments.  In the context of punitive damages, 
however, juries make them.  The challenge of a proportionality review is 
the difficulty of knowing when a legislatively authorized sentence or a jury 
award is excessive.40  An excessiveness evaluation necessarily involves a 
matter of degree regarding the gravity of the conduct and the measure of 
punishment,41 and the evaluation has no clear litmus test that separates 
excessive punishment from proper punishment.42   
What factors can reviewing courts use to assist in the proportionality 
determination, especially if reviewing courts wish to avoid deciding the 
issue on the subjective views of the judges as to the proper proportion of 
punishment to offense?  The one factor that seems to have the most 
influence is the legislative judgment about the proper proportion of 
punishment to misconduct. 43  Substantial deference by courts to legislative 
judgments about the maximum penalties in the criminal context reflects the 
importance of this factor.44  Although deference will not insulate a 
legislatively authorized punishment from a proportionality review, 
legislative judgments about the gravity of an offense and the proper 
punishment it deserves will withstand most proportionality challenges.45 
In the absence of legislative determinations regarding the 
proportionality of punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court has 
been forced to make its own judgments about the proportionality of 
                                                                                                                          
40 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 882–83 (commenting that proportionality is “an inevitably 
unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality” because of the difficulty “in translating the 
[proportionality] principle into a standard for judicial oversight”). 
41 Id. at 898 (“Ultimately, proportionality review demands a judgment about the seriousness of a 
defendant’s crime.”). 
42 Id. at 883 (“For all the Court’s invocation of objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of 
proportionality review remains fundamentally subjective.”). 
43 Id. at 898 (“Either the Supreme Court can look outward—to the ‘work product of legislatures 
and sentencing jury determinations’ . . . or it can look inward—to the Justices’ own understandings 
about the gravity of particular conduct.”). 
44 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25 (2003) (plurality opinion) (noting a 
“traditional deference to legislative policy choices” in sentencing); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 998–99 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“[R]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to 
the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishments for crimes.”) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 
45 It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the question of when courts should not defer to 
a legislative judgment and how courts should determine that a legislatively authorized punitive 
damages award or criminal sentence is excessive.  For a thoughtful discussion of these questions, see 
Karlan, supra note 9, at 889–93 (suggesting three circumstances under which a court might reject the 
legislative judgment regarding the proportionality of punishment).  This Article does not concede that 
the Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence in the criminal context is entirely justified and does 
not propose complete deference to legislative caps in the punitive damages context.   
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punitive damages awards in the context of constitutional review of state 
awards46 as well as in the exercise of common law review of federal 
awards.47  With no guidance from a legislative determination, the Court has 
engaged in a stricter scrutiny of punitive damages awards, adopting other 
reference points or guideposts for reviewing punitive damages awards for 
excessiveness.  These guideposts include an assessment of the gravity of 
the wrongful conduct based on the harm caused and the culpability of the 
offender,48 a comparison of the punishment with the harm caused,49 
comparisons with punishment for the same conduct in other jurisdictions, 
and comparisons with other punishments authorized for the different 
offenses in the same jurisdiction.50 
Punitive damages, to be morally justified and to conform to due 
process, must be limited and proportional to the wrong being punished.  
The determination of proportionality is a particularly legislative function 
entitled to judicial deference.  In the absence of legislative limits on 
punitive damages, judicial review of proportionality requires other 
reference points and invites an active judicial role.51  The recent United 
States Supreme Court cases addressing the proportionality of punishment 
in the context of prison terms, punitive damages, and forfeitures show that 
the presence or absence of legislative limits on punishment explains the 
different approaches used by the Court to decide whether a particular type 
of punishment is excessive.  Legislatures should set limits on punitive 
damages, as they do for criminal violations, that reflect societal judgments 
regarding the gravity of the wrongdoing and the amount of punishment 
deserved.  Caps for particular misconduct may be set low or quite high 
depending on the legislature’s judgment about the reprehensibility of the 
wrong.  Limits on punitive damages awards will provide notice of the 
maximum consequences for wrongful conduct, minimize wide disparities 
in the amount of punitive damages awards, and assist courts in the 
                                                                                                                          
46 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425–26 (2003) (explaining 
there were no legislative caps on the damages the jury could award in either state, Alabama or Utah, 
and the Court determined that the award of punitive damages in each case was excessive in view of the 
defendant’s conduct); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86, 595 (1996) (overturning 
the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court). 
47 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 33–40 (U.S. June 25, 2008) 
(adopting a ratio cap on punitive damages in federal admiralty cases). 
48 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (discussing the reprehensibility guidepost); BMW, 517 U.S. at 
575–76 (same). 
49 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424–26 (discussing the ratio guidepost); BMW, 517 U.S. at 580–82 
(same). 
50 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428 (discussing sanctions for comparable conduct guidepost); 
BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–84 (same). 
51 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co., No. 07-219, slip. op. at 29 (responsibility for regulating punitive 
damages in federal maritime cases lies with the Court in the absence of statute).  See also, Justice 
Stevens’ critique of the majority’s adoption of a ratio cap of 1:1 in the Exxon case.  Id. at 4 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting) (“The congressional choice not to limit the availability of punitive damages under maritime 
law should not be viewed as an invitation to make policy judgments.”). 
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proportionality analysis.  Moreover, the imposition of limits on punitive 
damages will bring this type of punishment into line with the principle of 
just punishment and the rule of law principle prohibiting arbitrary 
decisions with no constraints. 
II.  RETRIBUTION BASIS FOR PROPORTIONALITY 
Of the major theories of punishment, retribution provides the most 
principled basis for determining whether punitive damages are excessive or 
proportional. 52  Retribution justifies punishment because it is deserved due 
to wrongful conduct.53  Basic to the retribution theory is the notion of just 
deserts—persons should receive the punishment they deserve, no more and 
no less.54  What is deserved punishment depends on the wrongfulness of 
the conduct.  The more serious the crime, the harsher the punishment 
should be, and the severity of the punishment should reflect society’s 
“level of condemnation or disapproval” of the conduct.55  There is a degree 
of shared agreement about the relative wrongfulness of unlawful acts and 
about the relationship between the punishment scale and the wrongfulness 
scale.  For example, most criminal codes share the view that a deliberate 
killing is worse than a provoked intentional killing, which is worse than an 
unintentional reckless killing, which is worse than a negligent killing.56  In 
accordance with this hierarchy of homicides, criminal codes authorize 
different punishments for the different killings reflecting their relative 
seriousness. 
Retribution theory offers a formula for measuring the wrongfulness of 
                                                                                                                          
52 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 677, 683–84  (2005) (explaining that prohibition on excessive punishment should be understood 
as a “side constraint” that embodies retributivism); Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New 
Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 59–61 (2000) 
(arguing that only the retribution theory of punishment can adequately support proportionality 
principle). 
53 Parr, supra note 52, at 61.  
54 Lee, supra note 52, at 699–700.  
55 See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 71, 
89 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (“[T]he degree of disapproval expressed by the punishment 
should ‘fit’ the crime only in the unproblematic sense that the more serious crimes should receive 
stronger disapproval.”); Lee, supra note 52, at 710 (“The harshness of the punishment should reflect 
our level of condemnation or disapproval of the criminal act.”). 
56 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–12 (2000) (classifying a deliberate killing as murder in the first 
degree and punishable by death or life imprisonment, a provoked killing as voluntary manslaughter 
punishable by not more than ten years, and an unintentional killing not amounting to second degree 
murder as involuntary manslaughter punishable by no more than six years); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.00, 
125.10–.11, 125.15, 125.20–.22, 125.25, 125.27 (2008) (classifying an intentional killing as murder 
punishable by a term of fifteen years to life, a provoked killing as manslaughter in the first degree 
punishable up to twenty-five years, and an unintentional killing classified as either manslaughter in the 
second degree or criminally negligent homicide punishable up to fifteen years for manslaughter in the 
second degree or four years for criminally negligent homicide). 
 2008] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 121 
conduct, and therefore, the deserved punishment.57  The proper proportion, 
or just deserts, of punishment to crime depends on two factors—the harm 
caused or threatened and the culpability of the offender in committing the 
offense.58  This retributive notion—that punishment is deserved and that 
the severity of the punishment should be measured by how much 
punishment is deserved—embodies the concept of proportionality.59 
The notion of just deserts also reflects notions of fairness—fairness to 
the victim, to the law-abiding, and to the defendant.60  A penalty that is 
viewed as too lenient will be seen as unfair to victims, the law-abiding and 
other defendants who were punished more severely.  Likewise, a 
punishment that is viewed as too harsh in the sense that it is more severe 
than deserved will be seen as unfair to the defendant and an abuse of 
governmental power.   
The proportionality principle in retribution theory also reflects another 
aspect of fairness—uniformity and equal treatment.61  Offenders of similar 
culpability who commit the same crime should receive similar 
punishments, and offenders differing in culpability should receive different 
penalties based on just deserts, in proportion to their blameworthiness.62  
Concepts of fairness support both uniform, or at least similar, punishment 
for similarly situated defendants (fairness to the defendant and other 
defendants) and differential punishment for dissimilar offenders (fairness 
to be treated differently from other defendants whose conduct and 
culpability are markedly different).63 
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized that one of 
the purposes of punitive damages is deterrence, deterrence alone cannot 
justify punishment.  This utilitarian theory, which aims to prevent unlawful 
and harmful conduct in the future by using punishment as a painful lesson 
to the wrongdoer and others, has a moral foundation only if based on the 
wrongdoing of the defendant.  As a result, most criminal law theorists and 
moral philosophers view deterrence as a valid theory of punishment, but 
                                                                                                                          
57 See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363 (1981) (equating the punishment 
deserved to r x H, where r represents the degree of responsibility and H represents the magnitude of the 
harm). 
58 Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005) [hereinafter Frase, 
Punishment Purposes]; Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From 
“Why Punish?” to “How Much?”, 1 CRIM. L.F. 259, 282 (1990); see Lee, supra note 52, at 703 
(discussing Robert Nozick’s “contemporary restatement of retributivism”); see also Hugo Adam 
Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601, 602 (1978) (discussing the renewal 
of the theory of retribution). 
59 See von Hirsch, supra note 58, at 282.  
60 Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 73. 
61 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 24–25 
(1968) (arguing that like cases should be treated alike is a principle of justice that bears on the amount 
of punishment); Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 73–74. 
62 Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 74.  
63 Id. 
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one that can come into play only when it is proper to punish.64  And it is 
only proper to punish for retribution for having committed an unlawful act 
in the past.65 
Deterrence and other utilitarian theories, unlike retribution, do not help 
much in determining whether punishment is excessive.66  Utilitarian 
theories do not limit the amount of punishment based on the nature of the 
crime, and the punishment can be severe or lenient based on goals that 
have no relationship to the gravity of the wrong. 67  Punishment based on 
deterrence need not be anchored to the seriousness of the wrong.68  For 
example, if illegal parking is a major problem in a community, and there is 
a perceived need to deter illegal parking by imposing harsh sentences, a 
sentence of life imprisonment might well reduce such conduct.  In this 
extreme example, life imprisonment for parking violations, an example of 
excessive punishment offered by the Supreme Court,69 could be justified 
under a deterrence theory.70  Certainly, nothing in the deterrence theory 
would prohibit a life sentence for illegal parking if the cost-benefit 
calculation supported a life sentence. 
Likewise, the incapacitation theory of punishment, based on the need 
to prevent criminals from committing more crimes, may conflict with 
retribution principles.71  To use the same example above, if a person has 
                                                                                                                          
64 See, e.g., HART, supra note 61, at 1–12 (showing the importance of retribution in restricting 
punishment to offenders, no matter that punishment may have a deterrent effect); HERBERT PACKER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 16 (1968) (stating that prevention of crime, including 
deterrence of future crime, is the primary purpose of the criminal law, but that the prevention purpose 
must be limited by the principle that “a finding of moral responsibility is a necessary although not a 
sufficient condition for determining criminal guilt and meting out punishment for it”). 
65 Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 73. 
66 For a discussion of retributive and utilitarian theories as bases for determining the 
proportionality of punishment, see Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, 
and the Eighth Amendment: Proportionality Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590–96 (2005).  
Professor Frase sees retributive proportionality as the approach invoked by the Supreme Court.  Id. at 
592.  He identifies two proportionality concepts grounded in utilitarian theories that could be used to 
find punishment excessive.  Id.  He calls them “ends proportionality” (when the costs outweigh the 
benefits) and “means proportionality” (comparing the measure or sentence to less burdensome measure 
or sentences that will achieve the same benefits).  Id. at 593–96.  His discussion of the utilitarian 
proportionality concepts as applied to an evaluation of criminal sentences shows that these concepts do 
not operate apart from a retributive basis.  In his view, the utilitarian “proportionality principle has 
important elements in common with retributive proportionality—in particular, both principles require 
proportionality relative to offense severity and measure the latter from the defendant’s, not a public 
perspective”).  Id. at 594. 
67 See Lee, supra note 52, at 739–40 (noting that utilitarian theories are unable to serve as a theory 
of proportionality). 
68 Id. at 740.  
69 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S 957, 986 n.11 (1991) (plurality opinion); id. at 1018 (White, J., 
dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 288 (Powell, 
J., dissenting). 
70 Lee, supra note 52, at 739–40. 
71 See Parr, supra note 52, at 60–62 (noting that retribution theory offers the only theoretical 
justification for proportionate punishment); Richard H. Andrus, Note, Which Crime Is It?  The Role of 
Proportionality in Recidivist Sentencing After Ewing v. California, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 279, 292 (2004) 
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one hundred outstanding parking tickets and a criminal history that 
includes ten prior parking violation convictions, a life imprisonment 
sentence could be justified under an incapacitation theory.  This sentence 
would prevent this individual from committing further parking violations 
by removing him from the community.  Like deterrence, incapacitation 
theory has no limiting principle apart from what is necessary to prevent 
further crimes by the offender.72  Neither theory embodies a concept of 
proportionality based on the gravity of the crime, and neither theory limits 
punishment according to the wrongfulness of the conduct. Only the 
retribution theory limits punishment to the gravity of the crime and 
provides a principled basis for declaring the life sentence for the parking 
violator excessive and disproportionate to the wrong. 
Because of the conflicts between utilitarian purposes and just deserts 
principles, most jurisdictions have adopted a model that uses retribution as 
a limitation on utilitarian goals.73  This model, known as modified just 
deserts, “limiting retributivism,”74 or retribution as a side constraint,75 
assigns primacy to principles of retribution by using just deserts for an 
offender’s conduct to set both upper and lower limits on the severity of 
penalties that may be imposed.76  According to this model, utilitarian goals 
may be pursued within the limits of deserved punishment.  Within this 
range, other sentencing goals, such as deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation, may be appropriate in particular cases to determine the 
precise sentence to impose.77  Using modified just deserts, the recidivist 
shoplifter may be punished more severely than a first offender in order to 
serve the incapacitation goal, but within the limits determined according to 
retribution principles. 
Retribution theory offers the only principled way to evaluate 
punishment for excessiveness and to determine whether punishment is 
proportional to the crime.  The principle that punishment should not be 
harsher than deserved—that punishment must fit the crime and should be 
                                                                                                                          
(“[A] sentence considered cruel or unusual under the retribution theory of punishment will not 
necessarily be cruel or unusual under incapacitation, deterrence, or rehabilitation theories.”); cf. Steven 
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 163–67 (1995) (claiming that utilitarian theories of 
punishment support a form of proportionality).  
72 Parr, supra note 52, at 60.  
73 For commentary on using retribution to limit utilitarian goals, see, for example, Richard S. 
Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83, 97–98 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter Frase, Limiting Retributivisim]; Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 68; Frase, 
supra note 66, at 590–92. 
74 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 161 (1982). 
75 Lee, supra note 52, at 743 (“The goals of incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and 
rehabilitation can all be pursued under a regime with retributivism as a side constraint, as long as such 
pursuits do not violate the side constraint.”). 
76 Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 76. 
77 Id. at 76–77. 
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measured by the gravity of the crime—provides a principled basis for 
assessing whether punishment is excessive or proportional.  Other theories, 
like deterrence or incapacitation, permit penalties that would not be 
allowable under the retributivist theory.  As Justice Scalia pointed out, 
“proportionality is inherently a retributive concept” and “it becomes 
difficult even to speak intelligently of ‘proportionality’ once deterrence 
and rehabilitation are given significant weight.”78 
Although a pure retributive model of punishment would require strict 
proportionality between the offense/offender and the penalty, the notion of 
just deserts as applied to concrete cases lacks precision.79  It is a near 
impossible task to say that this degree of wrongfulness deserves only this 
degree of punishment.  The questions of what crimes deserve harsher 
punishment and what that punishment should be are highly contestable.80  
Punishment need only fit the crime in a broad sense.  Whereas there may 
be wide disagreement as to the particular penalty a particular conduct 
deserves, there will be greater consensus as to the range of proper 
punishment for that conduct.81  As a result, the proportionality principle 
requires only a rough proportionality based on a defined range of 
punishment for certain conduct with a definite upper limit. 
III.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS PUNISHMENT 
The imposition of punitive damages above and beyond any 
compensation to the victim clearly serves only one purpose—the 
punishment of the defendant.82  Punitive damages do not compensate other 
victims who are not before the court,83 and hence only serve the goal of 
punishing the wrongdoer.  With full compensation, the only function 
served by punitive damages is punishment.84  Attempts to characterize 
punitive damages as a type of broadened compensation,85 as social 
                                                                                                                          
78 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
79 See MORRIS, supra note 74, at 198–99 (arguing that the concept of just desert is inherently 
imprecise). 
80 Lee, supra note 52, at 744. 
81 Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 58, at 77. 
82 See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra note 26, at 743 (punitive damages no longer serve any substantial 
remedial function and are being used for retributive or deterrent purposes). 
83 Unlike the proposal of Professor Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 
6, at 352, punitive damages today do not go to other victims harmed by the defendant; rather, statewide 
class damages can be awarded to a single plaintiff.  Even if the plaintiff must split the punitive damages 
award with the state, the nature of the damages is still punitive since it goes beyond compensation. 
84 See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra note 26, at 747–48 (arguing that where the function and effect of 
damages are to compensate the plaintiff, even for attorney’s fees, they should be considered further 
remedial compensation and not punitive). 
85 This term is used by Professor Zipursky to describe those theories of punitive damages that 
view such damages as expanded compensatory damages.  He includes in this category compensation 
for intangibles.  Zipursky, supra note 9, at 138.  See Redish & Mathews, supra note 8, at 14–15 
(observing that punitive damages are an offshoot of the broader concept of exemplary damages). 
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damages,86 or as a type of lesser punishment different from criminal 
punishment87 fail to admit the nature of punitive damages as pure 
punishment.88  Nor does it matter that the punitive damages award goes to 
the plaintiff rather than the state.  “The question of where the award goes is 
conceptually independent of the question of whether the defendant [is 
punished by paying the award].”89 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of 
punitive damages is punishment.  According to the Court, compensatory 
and punitive damages serve different purposes.  Compensatory damages 
redress the loss suffered by the plaintiff, and punitive damages serve a 
broader purpose aimed at retribution and deterrence.90  
Significantly, the Court has referred to punitive damages as serving a 
state interest rather than private interests.  In BMW of North America, Inc. 
v. Gore, the Court stated that “[punitive damages] further a State’s 
legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its 
repetition.”91  This legitimate interest is also served by criminal sanctions.  
Viewing retribution and deterrence as state functions, the Court in Cooper, 
                                                                                                                          
86 See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 6, at 351, 354.  Professor Sharkey proposes a new category of 
damages—compensatory societal damages—that she claims are an unacknowledged component of 
punitive damages.  Id. at 351–52.  Professor Sharkey sees punitive damages as furthering a societal 
compensation goal of redressing harms to others besides the plaintiff in a particular case, and she 
proposes that this goal be recognized and furthered by using the additional damages to create a pool of 
money to compensate other victims who are not before the court.  Id. at 353–54, 389. 
87 Professor Zipursky describes two theories of punitive damages that attempt to justify punitive 
damages as lesser punishment.  In the private wrong theory advanced in Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the 
Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003), punitive damages intended to redress private wrongs do not require the 
protections required for criminal punishment of public wrongs.  In the private prosecution theory 
developed by Marc Galanter and David Luban in Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, supra note 6, at 1457–58, punitive damages sought by private parties, rather than the 
government, do not call for the same constitutional protections required for criminal punishment sought 
by the State.  Professor Zipursky sees both theories as inadequate to distinguish punitive damages from 
punishment akin to criminal punishment.  See Zipursky, supra note 9, at 142–46 (discussing societal 
damages—the redress of harms caused by the defendant who injured persons beyond the individual 
plaintiff). 
88 For a useful critique of these attempts to characterize punitive damages as something other than 
retributive punishment, see Zipursky, supra note 9, at 146–49.  Even Professor Zipursky’s attempt to 
develop a theory of punitive damages as having a double aspect, a civil aspect based on a plaintiff’s 
right to be punitive, and a criminal aspect based on society’s need to punish, fails in its ability to 
separate these aspects in a punitive damages award.  In his view, if, in a particular punitive damages 
award, the civil aspect predominates, it would not merit the special constitutional scrutiny like 
proportionality.  If, on the other hand, the particular award reflected society’s need to punish for 
retribution or deterrence, then this criminal aspect should require constitutional protections.  See id. at 
106–07 (discussing the tension between punitive damages as civil punishment versus punitive damages 
as criminal punishment).  This distinction does not matter to defendants who are ordered to pay money 
in excess of what is necessary to compensate the plaintiff.  In either aspect, punitive damages are 
punitive in form as well as in substance. 
89 Id. at 154. 
90 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 416 (2003); see also, Pacific Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (“[P]unitive damages are imposed for purposes of 
retribution and deterrence.”). 
91 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
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BMW and State Farm treated punitive damages, not as compensation to 
victims or to society, but as punishment akin to criminal sanctions.  Both 
criminal sanctions and punitive damages serve social goals of retribution 
and deterrence that go beyond private interests in receiving compensation 
for harms suffered.  And both criminal sanctions and punitive damages 
“are authorized by and enforced by organs of the state (courts).”92 
Punitive damages, like criminal sanctions, also carry a stigma.93  The 
fact that juries are instructed that punitive damages must be based on 
wrongdoing means that punitive damages awards express condemnation in 
the same way that a criminal conviction does.94  An award of punitive 
damages communicates public disapproval of the defendant’s conduct in 
the same way that a criminal fine does.  It makes no difference that a 
private party, rather than the government, seeks the punitive damages 
award.95  The authority of a private party to pursue punitive damages 
comes from the state, authorized by the legislature or the courts.96 
IV.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PROPORTIONALITY 
The United States Supreme Court has treated punitive damages as a 
type of punishment subject to a proportionality requirement.  Although 
punitive damages awards are not subject to the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause or the Excessive Fines Clause, “[t]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly 
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”97  In addition to 
constitutional limits, a “common law standard of excessiveness” limits 
punitive damages in federal maritime cases.98  Stating that punitive 
damages awards serve the same purpose as criminal penalties, the Court 
expressed concern that “punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary 
deprivation of property”99 because of the wide discretion allowed juries in 
                                                                                                                          
92 Fellmeth, supra note 26, at 744. 
93 See id. at 741–42 (“Punitive damages also parallel criminal fines that they may express social 
condemnation and carry stigma similar to criminal conviction.”). 
94 In this sense, punitive damages are justified primarily on a retribution theory even though 
punitive damages also serve a deterrence function.  For an argument that the retributive goal outweighs 
the deterrence function, see Zwier, supra note 6, at 419–27, 429 (arguing that punitive damages serve a 
corrective function based on just desert and retribution and pointing out the problems with a 
utilitarian/consequentialist approach based on optimum deterrence). 
95 Fellmeth, supra note 26, at 715.  
96 See id.  (“[T]he plaintiff has no authority or power to seek and collect punitive damages except 
as explicitly authorized and empowered by the appropriate legislature and courts.”). 
97 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 416 (2003). 
98 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 28 (U.S. June 25, 2008).   
99 Id. at 417 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)).  Professor Fellmeth 
sees deprivations of property for punishment purposes as requiring the same procedural protections that 
are considered necessary in criminal imprisonment cases.  He points out that “deprivations of property 
are adequately serious threats to personal liberty and dignity” to warrant heightened procedural 
protections.  Fellmeth, supra note 26, at 711.  Although he focuses on procedural protections, the 
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setting the amount of an award.  To address this concern, the Court has 
imposed both procedural and substantive limitations on the award of 
punitive damages.100  The procedural limitations include a requirement of 
judicial review of punitive damages awards101 and a requirement of de 
novo judicial review.102  In addition, the Court expressed the related 
concern about the lack of fair notice as to the severity of the punishment 
that may be imposed.103  According to the Court, “[e]lementary notions of 
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person 
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to 
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose.”104  In view of these concerns, the Court decided that the Due 
Process Clause imposes substantive limits on the jury’s discretion to award 
punitive damages and that excessive awards will be rejected as arbitrary 
and unconstitutional.105  The Court also implied that Due Process concerns 
may limit multiple punitive damages awards to different plaintiffs based on 
the same conduct.106 
The United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America v. Gore 
for the first time vacated a punitive damages award as excessive under the 
Due Process Clause.107  A jury in Alabama awarded Dr. Gore 
                                                                                                                          
requirement of limits on punishment should be the same for both money penalties and imprisonment.  
Id. 
100 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) (“ [The] Court has found that the 
Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures . . . and to amounts forbidden as 
‘grossly excessive.’”). 
101 Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 432. 
102 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 441, 443 (2001). 
103 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416–17.  
104 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
No. 07-219, slip. op. at 29 (U.S. June 25, 2008) (“[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its 
severity.”). 
105 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.  Interestingly, the guideposts adopted by the Court to determine 
whether a punitive damage award is excessive provide little in the way of notice as to the severity of 
the punishment in dollars that may be awarded.  Only the ratio guidepost gives some notice as to the 
extent of punitive damages that may be awarded, but even that guidepost does not provide definite 
notice because the ratio depends on the compensatory damages and may vary within single digits.  See 
also Zipursky, supra note 9, at 118 (noting that the analysis in BMW concerning the three guideposts 
does not address the issue of notice). 
106 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423 (“Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of 
multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.”).  The issue of multiple punitive damage 
awards is a topic beyond the scope of this Article.  For a recent review of this issue and a proposed 
solution, see Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National Punitive 
Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1653–54 (2005) (proposing that defendants who register a 
punitive damage award in a national registry be entitled to a dollar for dollar credit against any future 
punitive damage award based on the same conduct). 
107 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.  The Supreme Court had previously recognized that the Due Process 
Clause prohibits excessive awards, but the Court had never vacated an award of punitive damages until 
BMW.  See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 433 (“Despite the broad discretion that States possess with 
respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion.”); 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54, 465–66 (1993) (noting that previous 
Supreme Court decisions held that the Due Process Clause imposed a substantive limit on punitive 
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compensatory damages of $4000 and punitive damages of $4 million, later 
reduced to $2 million by the Alabama Supreme Court.108  Dr. Gore sued 
BMW of North America after discovering that his BMW sedan, which he 
purchased for just over $40,000, had been repainted before it was sold to 
him as new without his knowledge.109  BMW, pursuant to a nationwide 
policy, repaired cars that were damaged in the course of manufacture or 
transportation, and if the cost of the repairs did not exceed three percent of 
the car’s retail price, the car was sold as new without disclosure of the 
repairs.110  Because the cost of repainting Dr. Gore’s car was less than two 
percent of the price, BMW did not disclose the repair to the dealer or Dr. 
Gore.111  Dr. Gore based his claim for punitive damages on evidence that, 
since 1983, BMW had sold 983 refinished cars as new, including fourteen 
in Alabama, without disclosure.112  Dr. Gore argued that that the loss in 
value of each car was about $4000 and “that a punitive damages award of 
$4 million would provide an appropriate penalty for selling approximately 
1000 cars for more than they were worth.”113 
A.  Proportionality Guideposts 
To determine whether a punitive damages award is excessive under the 
Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court adopted three 
guideposts in BMW of North America v. Gore114—degree of 
reprehensibility,115 ratio of punitive damages award to compensatory 
damages,116 and sanctions for comparable misconduct.117  Applying these 
guideposts to the Alabama Supreme Court’s award, the Court found the 
punitive damage award of $2 million against BMW was excessive.118   
The United States Supreme Court applied the BMW guideposts in the 
more recent case of State Farm v. Campbell, concluding that the $145 
million punitive damages award against State Farm was excessive under 
the Due Process Clause.119 
Campbell, insured by State Farm, sued State Farm in a bad faith action 
after State Farm refused to settle the claim against Campbell for the policy 
                                                                                                                          
damage awards); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991) (holding that the 
punitive damages award was not a violation of the Due Process Clause). 
108 BMW, 517 U.S. at 565, 567.  
109 Id. at 563.  
110 Id. at 563–64. 
111 Id. at 564.  
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 574–75. 
115 Id. at 575. 
116 Id. at 580. 
117 Id. at 583. 
118 Id. at 585–86. 
119 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 425–26, 429 (2003). 
 2008] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 129 
limit and then refused to cover the jury award in excess of the policy 
limit.120  State Farm also declined to post an appeal bond, and a State Farm 
agent told Campbell, “You may want to put for sale signs on your property 
to get things moving.”121  The jury awarded compensatory damages of $2.6 
million and punitive damages of $145 million, which the trial court 
reduced to $1 million and $25 million, respectively.122  The Utah Supreme 
Court, applying the guideposts from BMW, reinstated the $145 million 
punitive damages award.123 
B.  Reprehensibility Guidepost 
The first guidepost from BMW, the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, is the most important according to the Court.124  This 
guidepost reflects a proportionality standard that measures the amount of 
the punitive damages award against the severity of the offense.  According 
to the Court, “some wrongs are more blameworthy than others,” and 
punishment should reflect the gravity of the defendant’s conduct.125  In 
assessing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the Court 
articulated five relevant factors and a number of inappropriate ones.  The 
relevant factors include (1) whether the harm caused was physical or 
economic;126 (2) whether the conduct showed an indifference to or a 
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;127 (3) whether the 
conduct targeted a financially vulnerable victim;128 (4) whether the conduct 
involved repeated actions;129 and (5) whether the harm resulted from 
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or from accident.130  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has added another factor for 
evaluating reprehensibility—mitigation efforts by the defendant to 
ameliorate any harm.131  These factors, in large part, focus on the 
culpability of the defendant, rather than on the harm caused.  Only the first 
factor focuses on the harm.  The others relate to the defendant’s state of 
                                                                                                                          
120 Id. at 413.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 415.  
123 Id. 
124 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 576.  The Ninth Circuit considered mental distress caused by economic injury as a factor 
that makes conduct more reprehensible.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“The massive disruption of lives is entirely predictable when a giant oil tanker goes astray.  Thus 
Exxon’s reprehensibility goes considerably beyond the mere careless imposition of economic harm.”). 
127 BMW, 517 U.S. at 576. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 577. 
130 Id. at 576. 
131 Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d at 1084 (“Reprehensibility should be discounted if defendants act 
promptly and comprehensively to ameliorate any harm they cause in order to encourage such socially 
beneficial behavior.”) (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1242 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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mind, using the concept of mens rea to determine the degree of 
reprehensibility—the more intentional or reckless the conduct, the more 
reprehensible. 
Applying these reprehensibility factors in BMW, the Court concluded 
that none of the factors supported reprehensibility.132  The harm caused 
was purely economic,133 BMW’s conduct did not show reckless 
indifference for the health and safety of others,134 and the evidence 
disclosed no deliberate false statements, affirmative misconduct, 
concealment of evidence, or improper motive.135  Although the Court 
recognized that repeated misconduct may be relevant to the 
reprehensibility analysis, it rejected the argument that BMW’s conduct was 
particularly reprehensible because of its nationwide practice of not 
disclosing presale refinishing of cars.136  The Court noted that BMW’s 
practice was not unlawful in every state and that its nationwide practice did 
not constitute repeated misconduct that reflected more reprehensibility than 
a single instance of misconduct.137  The Court thus concluded BMW’s 
conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant a substantial punitive 
damages award of $2 million.138  
In State Farm, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the $145 
million award in light of BMW’s principles and found the award excessive.  
Applying the reprehensibility factors identified in BMW, the Court found 
that State Farm’s conduct, while reprehensible, was not so egregious as to 
merit a punitive damages award of $145 million.139  In addition, the Court 
noted that the award was based on inappropriate evidence of 
reprehensibility.  It rejected as part of the reprehensibility analysis the Utah 
court’s reliance on out-of-state conduct,140 harm caused to other people by 
dissimilar misconduct,141 and wealth of the defendant.142  Although the 
Court in State Farm, as it did in BMW, recognized that repeated 
misconduct tends to show a greater degree of reprehensibility, it said that 
the misconduct must be of the same type that injured the plaintiff.143  As a 
result, the Court limited the consideration of prior bad acts of the defendant 
to those similar to the misconduct that caused the plaintiff’s harm.144  The 
Court, concerned that the reprehensibility guidepost not be expanded to 
                                                                                                                          
132 BMW, 517 U.S. at 576. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 579. 
136 Id. at 576–77.  
137 Id. at 576–78.  
138 Id. at 578.  
139 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 419–20 (2003). 
140 Id. at 428. 
141 Id. at 422–23. 
142 Id. at 427 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996)). 
143 Id. at 423. 
144 Id. at 423–24. 
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permit a defendant to be punished for any wrongs in the past, limited the 
evidence relevant to the reprehensibility evaluation.145 
A more recent case, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, requires trial 
courts to protect against juries misusing evidence of harm to others.146  
Punitive damages cannot punish for the harm caused to others,147 and trial 
courts must ensure that juries do not punish a defendant for injuries 
inflicted on nonparties.148  The Court recognized and approved evidence of 
harm to others as relevant to the reprehensibility analysis, stating that harm 
to others may show greater reprehensibility,149 but the Court expressed 
concern that juries may misuse this evidence to punish a defendant for 
harm caused to others not involved in the litigation.150  The Court 
characterized as significant the risk that juries may misunderstand the two 
uses of this evidence and imposed on trial courts the obligation to protect 
against that risk.151 
The Court’s discussion in State Farm of the defendant’s wealth in 
assessing the excessiveness of a punitive damages award reflects a 
retributive view of punitive damages.  State Farm rejected the defendant’s 
wealth as a factor that bears a relationship to an award’s reasonableness or 
proportionality to the harm,152 and cautioned against relying on wealth to 
justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.  In essence, 
wealth has nothing to do with the wrongfulness of conduct, except, 
perhaps, for the unusual situation where a defendant uses his wealth to do 
more harm.  In such a case, the wealth becomes part of the wrongful 
conduct.153  Consideration of a defendant’s wealth would be relevant under 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id. at 424.  For a comparison of how the United States Supreme Court permits the use of prior 
wrongdoing in criminal sentencing and punitive damages, see Wayne A. Logan, Civil and Criminal 
Recidivists: Extraterritoriality in Tort and Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2005) (stating that 
“sentences of criminal offenders are enhanced without regard for whether their prior offenses occurred 
outside the forum state,” but noting that extraterritorial wrongdoing is permitted a limited role in the 
formulation of punitive damage awards). 
146 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007).  
147 Id. at 1063 (“In our view, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a 
punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties . . . .”). 
148 Id. at 1064 (“We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide 
assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine 
reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers.”). 
149 Id. at 1065 (“[W]e recognize that conduct that risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible 
than conduct that risks harm to only a few.  And a jury consequently may take this fact into account in 
determining reprehensibility.”). 
150 Id. (“How can we know whether a jury, in taking account of harm caused others under the 
rubric of reprehensibility, also seeks to punish the defendant for having caused injury to others?”). 
151 Id. (“[W]e believe that where the risk of that misunderstanding is a significant one . . . a court, 
upon request, must protect against that risk.”).  The Court did not specify how courts should protect 
against this risk and instead left it to the States to determine how to assure that juries do not misuse 
evidence of harm to others.  Id. 
152 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 427 (2003). 
153 See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that State Farm does not preclude consideration of defendant’s worth if used to mount an extremely 
aggressive defense that makes litigation costly for plaintiffs). 
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a deterrence theory that would impose enough punishment to make the 
pain exceed any benefit.  Retribution theory, however, does not require that 
wealthy defendants feel the pain of monetary punishment.  Retribution 
measures the punishment by the degree of wrongfulness, and how a 
punished person feels about a punitive damages award, fine, or prison term 
says nothing about the wrongfulness of the conduct. 
C.  Ratio Guidepost 
The Court in BMW also evaluated the punitive damages award under 
the second guidepost, the ratio of the punitive damages to compensatory 
damages.  Stating that punitive damages must bear a reasonable 
relationship to the harm done,154 the Court refused to specify a ratio that 
marks the line between reasonable and unreasonable punitive damages.155  
The Court, however, provided some guidance as to an acceptable ratio 
when it referred to previously approved ratios of 4:1 and 10:1 from earlier 
cases.156  Because the $2 million punitive damages award against BMW 
was five-hundred times the harm to Dr. Gore, the Court viewed the 500:1 
ratio as “breathtaking” and unacceptable.157 
Evaluating the $145 million punitive damages award in State Farm 
under the ratio guidepost, the Court found that the ratio of 145:1 was 
excessive.  As in BMW, the Court declined to impose a ratio cap on 
punitive damages, but it clearly signaled that punitive awards with a ratio 
above 9:1 would be excessive.  As the Court put it, “few awards exceeding 
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”158  At the same time, the Court 
indicated that punitive damages awards with ratios of up to 4:1 would be 
acceptable in view of the Court’s approval of these single-digit ratios in 
past cases.159  According to the Court, the punishment must be 
proportionate, not only to the misconduct, but also to the amount of harm 
                                                                                                                          
154 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996). 
155 Id. at 582.  In contrast, the Court did adopt a fixed ratio cap in the exercise of its common law 
authority to regulate punitive damages in federal maritime cases.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 
07-219, slip. op. at 28 (U.S. June 25, 2008).   
156 Id. at 581 (referring to a 4:1 ratio in Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 
(1991), and a 10:1 ratio in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 472 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
157 BMW, 517 U.S. at 583. 
158 State Farm, 538 U. S. at 425. 
159 Id.  The Court has also upheld punitive damages ratios substantially above 10:1.  The Court 
has upheld a punitive award 106 times compensatory damages.  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989) (upholding compensatory damages of $51,146 and 
punitive damages of $6,000,000).  Similarly, in TXO, the court upheld an award 526 times the 
compensatory damages.  TXO, 509 U.S. at 451 (upholding compensatory damages of $19,000 and 
punitive damages of $10,000,000). 
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caused to the plaintiff.160 
The Court also included potential harm as part of the ratio guidepost,161 
but did not indicate how potential harm should be determined or how it 
should be measured in dollar terms for purposes of determining the 
appropriate ratio between potential harm and the punitive damages award.  
A ratio based on actual compensatory damages is easy to calculate, but the 
Court gave no guidance as to how potential harm to others should be 
valued.  As a result, lower courts have differed in their use of potential 
harm in the ratio analysis.162   
Two cases from different jurisdictions involving the same defendant 
tobacco company viewed potential harm quite differently.  The California 
Court of Appeals recognized the potential harm beyond the actual harm 
suffered by the plaintiff smoker,163 but did not take potential harm into 
account in its ratio analysis.164  As a result, the California Court of Appeals 
found the 17:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
unconstitutional.165  In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court focused on 
both the actual harm to the plaintiff and the potential harm caused by the 
defendant to other smokers in Oregon in justifying a punitive damages 
award of $79.5 million, a 96:1 ratio based on the compensatory 
damages.166  These two cases illustrate the divergent approaches to the 
ratio guidepost and the difficulty of applying a ratio analysis to a harm that 
is not reduced to a dollar figure. 
The State Farm case refined the ratio guidepost, and, in doing so, made 
it more significant than the reprehensibility guidepost.167  By signaling 
what ratios will likely be excessive and what ratios will likely be 
acceptable, the Court has made this guidepost the easiest to apply.  
Notwithstanding its efforts to disclaim any bright line ratio that marks the 
                                                                                                                          
160 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.  For a critique of the Court’s linking punitive damages awards to 
compensatory damages and limiting punitive damages to a single-digit ratio, see Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Punitive Damages, Descriptive Statistics, and the Economy of Civil Litigation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2025, 2030–31 (2004).  Professor Yeazell found empirical support for the 9:1 ratio in a study by 
Theodore Eisenberg showing that eighty percent of all punitive damages awards did not exceed 8.117 
times the compensatory damages; the study was not cited by the Court in State Farm, although two 
amicus briefs cited the Eisenberg study.  Id. at 2039. 
161 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424–25.  The Court in Philip Morris USA limited potential harm to 
that caused to the plaintiff.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007). 
162 See Jiang, supra note 9, at 802–06 (2006) (stating that lower courts have struggled to define 
potential harm and have come to different conclusions as to how and whether to use potential harm in 
the ratio calculation). 
163 Henley v. Philip Morris Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 81–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
164 Id. at 85. 
165 Id. 
166 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171, 1182 (Or. 2006). 
167 See Andrew C.W. Lund, The Road From Nowhere? Punitive Damage Ratios After BMW v. 
Gore and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 20 TOURO L. REV. 943, 984 
(2005) (indicating that in State Farm, the Court subordinated the reprehensibility factor to the ratio 
guidepost). 
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due process limit on punitive damages, the Court’s references to excessive 
and reasonable ratios invites reliance on this guidepost for assessing the 
excessiveness of particular awards.  As a result, this guidepost has the most 
bite in curbing excessive awards.  Indeed, cases following the State Farm 
decision seem to have focused largely on the ratio in evaluating the 
propriety of the award.168 
The Court’s reliance on the ratio between punitive damages and 
compensatory damages means that the punishment must be proportional to 
both the misconduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.  In essence, 
there are two proportionality requirements—the award must be 
proportional to the wrongful conduct (reprehensibility analysis) and 
proportional to the harm suffered (ratio analysis).169  Because it is easy to 
multiply compensatory damages by some ratio and because of the guidance 
provided by the Court in terms of acceptable and unacceptable ratios, the 
second guidepost has shifted the proportionality analysis focus from the 
wrongful conduct to the harm caused.  It is much more difficult to 
determine the degree of reprehensibility than to apply a ratio, and even if 
the degree of reprehensibility could be determined with some certainty or 
agreement, the further task of assigning a dollar figure to it becomes a 
nearly impossible guess.  Although the Court said that State Farm’s 
conduct was reprehensible and did not justify an award of $145 million, it 
is significant that the Court did not say what was the degree of 
reprehensibility or what would be proper punishment in dollars for State 
Farm’s wrongful behavior.170  In essence, the difficulty of applying the 
reprehensibility analysis171 means that courts, including the Supreme 
Court, find it easier to rely on the ratio of punitive damages to 
                                                                                                                          
168 See Charles S. Doskow, The State Farm Punitive Damage Multiplier in the Courts: Early 
Returns, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 61, 71–80 (2004) (observing that, on remand from the United States 
Supreme Court, state courts generally reduce punitive damage verdicts to single digit sums, and that 
courts reviewing verdicts either reduce the award to a single digit ratio or uphold the verdicts by re-
characterizing the amount of the compensatory damages); see also McClain v. Metabolife Int’l Inc., 
259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (anointing ratio analysis “the most potent ingredient in 
the witch’s brew”); Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amena Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974 (N.D. Iowa 2003) 
(holding that even where reprehensible considerations are present, ratio cannot exceed 10:1); TVT 
Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the 
United States Supreme Court’s ratio rulings are quite audible). 
169 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 425–26 (2003). 
170 The Court indicated, however, that application of the three BMW guideposts, especially in 
light of the substantial compensatory damages, “likely would justify a punitive damages award at or 
near the amount of the compensatory damages.”  Id. at 429. 
171 The difficulty of evaluating the reprehensibility of conduct is vividly illustrated by the very 
different conclusions regarding the reprehensibility of State Farm’s conduct by the United States 
Supreme Court (not so reprehensible as to justify the award) and the Utah Supreme Court (egregious 
and abusive conduct justifying a very high award).  See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 
P.3d 409, 414, 420 (Utah 2004) (finding State Farm’s behavior to be so egregious as to warrant the 
large punitive damages award, only to have the award overturned by the Supreme Court); see also 
Jiang, supra note 9, at 801–02 (2006) (criticizing the reprehensibility factor in the proportionality 
analysis because of its fluidity). 
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compensatory damages to assess excessiveness under the Due Process 
Clause.  Reliance on the ratio for proportionality analysis may also reflect 
a preference for a guidepost that has a quantitative basis and makes judicial 
judgment about the proper limit of punishment in a particular case seem 
less arbitrary. 
How should a court decide what is the appropriate ratio?  The Supreme 
Court has not provided much guidance for determining the appropriate 
ratio of punitive damages to harm.  The Ninth Circuit has focused on the 
amount of compensatory damages and the egregiousness of the defendant’s 
conduct in determining the multiplier.172  Under this approach, the 
reprehensibility of the conduct informs the proper ratio: the greater the 
reprehensibility the higher the ratio.  Using this framework, the Ninth 
Circuit applied a ratio of 5:1 in the Exxon Valdez case producing a punitive 
damages award of $2.5 billion.173 
The use of compensatory damages as part of the proportionality 
analysis may also reflect the notion that the harm caused by wrongful 
conduct should figure in measuring reprehensibility.174  Criminal codes 
typically measure the wrongfulness of conduct according to the harm 
caused.  For example, killing another is viewed as more serious than 
severely injuring a person, and punishment schemes reflect this hierarchy 
of wrongfulness by punishing a homicide much more severely than an 
assault with intent to commit murder, even though the conduct and 
culpability that produced the death or injury are the same.175  As a result, 
two defendants who commit the same act with the same culpability of 
intent to kill will receive different punishment depending on whether their 
victims die or live. 
Although traditional criminal law does take harm into account in 
grading the severity of different crimes, this feature of criminal law has its 
critics.  According to these critics, the harm caused by the misconduct says 
little about the wrongfulness of the conduct.176  The misconduct may result 
                                                                                                                          
172 In re the Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007); see Planned Parenthood v. 
American Coal. of Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949, 962 (9th Cir. 2005) (using a rough framework to 
determine the appropriate ratio: a four to one ratio is appropriate where there are significant economic 
but not particularly egregious conduct, a ratio above four is appropriate where there are significant 
economic damages and more egregious behavior, and a double digit ratio may be appropriate where 
there are insignificant economic damages but particularly egregious behavior). 
173 Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d at 1095.  This award was reduced to $507 million by the Supreme 
Court after adopting a ratio cap of 1:1.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 42 (U.S. 
June 25, 2008).   
174 Professor Karlan views compensatory damages as “an indication of the gravity of the offense 
that uses the very currency in which punishment is to be meted out.”  Karlan, supra note 9, at 907. 
175 Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a)–(b) (2000) (authorizing death or life imprisonment for first 
degree murder and “any term of years” to life for second degree murder, and death or life imprisonment 
for first degree murder), with 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing up to twenty years 
imprisonment for an assault with intent to commit murder). 
176 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 52–53 (1965) (according 
greater punishment on the basis of the harm caused “conflicts with important principles of justice as 
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in no harm, little harm, or serious injuries to one or more persons.  The 
drunk driver acts with the same culpability whether he kills someone, 
harms another’s property, or avoids an accident.  According to some 
criminal law theorists, defendants who engage in the same conduct with 
the same culpability should receive the same punishment without regard to 
the harm caused.177  These theorists claim that the law should pay attention 
to the defendant’s conduct and culpability rather than to results, which may 
be fortuitous.  For these reasons, these critics suggest that punishment 
should be based solely on the conduct and culpability of the defendant and 
not on the results of that conduct.178 
Nevertheless, legislatures do accord significance to resulting harm in 
ranking crimes for purposes of punishment.  Even though consequences of 
conduct may be irrelevant to the culpability of the offender, legislatures 
view the occurrence and degree of harm as significant factors in 
determining the seriousness of an offense.179  Legislatures regard offenses 
causing harm as more reprehensible, thus meriting more severe punishment 
than the same conduct without a harmful result.  In addition, the 
seriousness of offenses also depends on the degrees of the harm caused.  
Legislatures have made the judgment that harmful results count in grading 
crimes and punishment. 
The United States Supreme Court also considers resulting harm as 
relevant to its proportionality analysis under both the reprehensibility and 
ratio guideposts.  The Court listed harm, including harm to others, as one 
of the factors to be considered in the reprehensibility analysis,180 and the 
                                                                                                                          
between different offenders which would prima facie preclude treating two persons . . . differently 
because of a fortuitous difference in the outcome of [their] acts.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and 
Punishment:  A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1497, 1601–03 (1974) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment] (arguing that the 
objectives of criminal law are best served when punishments are based on the conduct and not on the 
result); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Attempt, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 96–97 
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (questioning the rationales for different punishments for attempts that 
result in no harm and for the same conduct causing harm).  But see C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND 
PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 155 (1987) (stating that “the moral seriousness of an 
offense is a function of two major factors—the harm done and the culpability of the offender”). 
177 See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 153–54 (1983) (“[A]n 
offender ought only to be held responsible for that which he chose to bring about, or at least chose to 
risk.”). 
178 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment, supra note 176, at 1605–07 (arguing for the 
abolition of results-based sentencing).  For example, one victim of an assault may die because of a 
preexisting medical condition, while another victim of a similar assault may survive the attack because 
of the prompt response of emergency personnel.  The conditions that determine whether a victim lives 
or dies are countless, and, for the most part, unaffected by the defendant’s conduct or culpability. 
179 See id. at 1498–99 (noting that “every American criminal code [in additional to the Model 
Penal Code] relates the gravity of the crime to the results of the conduct”). 
180 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007) (accepting the 
claim that demonstrating harm to nonparties can help prove reprehensibility); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (“We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of 
a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic . . . .”); 
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Court essentially gives the harm caused an outcome-determinative role 
under the ratio guidepost.  Because the amount of compensatory damages 
measures the harm done, the ratio guidepost may produce a punitive 
damages award that does not reflect the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct.181  The Court recognized the possibility of an incongruity between 
reprehensibility and harm when it stated that in some cases the harm 
caused may not reflect the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, 
noting that “low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a 
higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic 
damages.”182  In addition, “[a] higher ratio may also be justified in cases in 
which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic 
harm might have been difficult to determine.”183  These statements suggest 
that, at least in some cases, compensatory damages provide little or no 
guidance in the proportionality analysis, and that the egregiousness or 
reprehensibility of the conduct is the proper benchmark.  The notion that 
compensatory damages may not reflect the wrongfulness of unlawful 
behavior may explain the willingness of circuit courts to allow higher 
ratios in cases where the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights and the plaintiff suffered little in the way of damages to be 
compensated.184 
D.  Sanction Comparison Guidepost 
Applying the third guidepost in BMW, the Court compared the punitive 
damages award to statutory fines in Alabama and other states for similar 
conduct.  The maximum civil penalty in Alabama for violation of the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act was $2000; other states for similar conduct 
imposed maximum penalties ranging from $5000 to $10,000.185  The Court 
found that the $2 million award against BMW greatly exceeded these 
                                                                                                                          
BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996) (explaining that some wrongs are more 
blameworthy than others and that nonviolent crimes are less serious than violent crimes). 
181 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 907–08 (“[C]ompensatory damages awards do not fully 
capture the magnitude of a defendant’s wrongdoing in two ways relevant to determining punitive 
damages.  As a matter of retribution, compensatory awards will understate the defendant’s moral 
culpability in cases where the defendant’s wrongful designs are not fully realized.  Moreover, . . . a 
punitive damages award might also properly reflect ‘the possible harm to other victims that might . . . 
result[] if similar future behavior were not deterred,’ a harm obivously not captured in the 
compensatory award . . . .”) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 
(1993)). 
182 BMW, 517 U.S. at 582. 
183 Id. 
184 See, e.g., Garrett T. Charon, Note, Beyond a Bar of Double-Digit Ratios: State Farm v. 
Campbell’s Impact on Punitive Damages Awards, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 630–31 (2005) (discussing 
circuit court decisions awarding large ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages in cases 
where constitutional rights are at issue). 
185 BMW, 517 U.S. at 584. 
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statutory maxima and that none of these statutes provide notice that 
violations would subject the violator to a multimillion dollar penalty.186 
The Court in State Farm refined the third guidepost from BMW by 
eliminating as a relevant comparison any criminal penalty for the same or 
similar conduct.  Although the Court noted that a criminal penalty may 
reflect the seriousness of the wrongful conduct in a state, the Court stated 
that the authorization of criminal imprisonment is not much help in 
determining the dollar amount of a punitive damages award.187  The Court 
cautioned against reliance on a relevant criminal prison term to justify a 
high award, probably because lower courts, interpreting this guidepost, saw 
criminal sanctions as justifying large awards.188  Lower courts got the 
message and adopted the view that criminal penalties are not a factor that 
can be considered in the proportionality analysis.189  Other courts, 
however, have stated that criminal penalties are relevant in assessing 
punitive damages but not in a way that provides any guidance in how 
criminal penalties inform the dollar amount of punitive damages.190 
Comparison to relevant civil sanctions remains valid under the third 
guidepost, and the Court in State Farm relied on a Utah law for fraud that 
carried a $10,000 civil fine.191  The Court found the $145 million punitive 
damages award dwarfed the civil fine for State Farm’s misconduct.192  
What counts as civil penalties, however, is not clear.  The Court found the 
most relevant civil penalty in the State Farm case to be the civil fine.  
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court took a broader view of civil 
sanctions and considered the loss of a license to do business to be a civil 
penalty for comparison purposes.193  The potential loss of business, 
according to the Utah court, would cost State Farm more than $10,000, 
                                                                                                                          
186 Id. at 583–84. 
187 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003). 
188 After BMW was decided, a number of large punitive damages awards were affirmed by courts 
relying on the existence of criminal prison terms for similar conduct.  For examples of this practice, see 
the cases cited in Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating Punitive 
Damages: Lifting the Haze From the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 480 
(2004).  The Court in State Farm may have intended to stop that practice. 
189 See, e.g., Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Bocci v. 
Key Pharm. Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 675–76 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
190 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007) (accepting the 
claim that demonstrating harm to nonparties can help prove reprehensibility); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 
F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1107–08 (D. Alaska 2004) (explaining that it is not unreasonable to evaluate the 
constitutionality of a punitive damages award by taking into account whether the defendant had notice 
that its conduct could be subject to severe punishment). 
191 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428.  For a proposal to place greater reliance on the third guidepost, 
see Chanenson & Gotanda, supra note 188, at 478–87 (proposing a “presumptive limit” on punitive 
damages awards by focusing on comparable monetary fines authorized by statute).  
192 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428. 
193 Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 418–19 (Utah 2004). 
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further justifying the large punitive damage award.194 
E.  Inadequacy of Guideposts for Determining Proportionality 
The disagreement in State Farm between the United States Supreme 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court regarding the amount of punitive 
damages demonstrates the difficulty in determining when the dollar 
amount of punitive damages crosses the line and becomes excessive.  Both 
courts considered the award under BMW’s three guideposts and came to 
very different conclusions.  In addition, the State Farm decision shows that 
the United States Supreme Court gives little or no deference to the 
proportionality decisions of the jury or state supreme courts.  In reviewing 
punitive damages awards for proportionality, the Court makes its own 
judgment regarding the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and its 
own judgment as to whether the amount of the award is proportional.  
Moreover, the Court has determined that a proportional award must be 
measured by a fairly strict ratio cap.  The ratio basis for evaluating the 
proper proportionality of punitive damages cannot be defended on any 
principled basis by the Court.  Any ratio, whether 4:1, 9:1, or double-digit 
to one, is arbitrary, and no principle supports one ratio over another.195 
V.  CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY 
The United States Supreme Court has taken a very different approach 
to the review of criminal sentences for proportionality.  Unlike its stricter 
scrutiny of punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause, the 
Court has adopted in the criminal sanction context a proportionality 
analysis that defers to the legislative judgment on the proper amount of 
punishment.196  Only in death penalty cases does the Court undertake a 
strict proportionality review.197  Even in death penalty cases, the Court’s 
assessment of proportional punishment is influenced by legislative 
judgments.198  Because the gravity of an offense is debatable and often the 
                                                                                                                          
194 See id. at 418 n.8 and accompanying text (“[W]e recognize that State Farm’s behavior . . . may 
indeed be justification for termination of its license, a penalty that surely would cost it more than 
$10,000.”).  
195 A ratio limit adopted by a legislature stands on a different footing.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 6 (U.S. June 25, 2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (state legislatures have 
imposed ratio caps and Congress could do so since “Congress is far better situated than is the Court to 
assess the empirical data, and to balance competing policy interests, before making such a choice”). 
196 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (“[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a 
democratically elected legislature . . . we presume its validity.”).  
197 Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 73, 135 n.419 (2007).  
198 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 179–80 (1976) (indicating that the Court will look to 
objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction to determine whether the death 
penalty is proportionate to the offense, and noting that “the most marked indication of society’s 
endorsement of the death penalty for murder” is that at least thirty-five states adopted some form of 
capital punishment in the wake of Furman) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).  The 
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subject of disagreement,199 the Court views legislatively authorized 
punishment for a crime as the most reliable measure of proportional 
punishment.200  As a result, it upholds almost any criminal sentence that is 
challenged as excessive.201  The critical difference between the Court’s 
approaches in reviewing punitive damages and criminal sentences for 
excessiveness is the presence of legislative limits on criminal punishment 
and the absence of legislative limits on punitive damages awards.  The 
Court, unwilling to second guess the legislative judgment, defers to the 
legislature’s determination as to the proper amount of punishment.  Only in 
the rare case where the Court considers the sentence to be grossly 
disproportionate to the crime will the Court disregard what the legislature 
regarded as appropriate punishment for the particular crime.202 
In the criminal context, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
includes a proportionality requirement, and as a result the Eighth 
Amendment imposes a limit on excessive or disproportional prison 
sentences.203  The majority of the Court in Solem v. Helm, stating that both 
the death penalty and imprisonment must be proportionate to the crime,204 
rejected the dissenters’ view that a proportional review of criminal 
sentences would thrust the Court into a line-drawing exercise that involves 
“visceral reactions of the individual Justices.”205  Responding to the 
dissent’s view that proportionality review substitutes subjective judicial 
judgments for legislative judgments,206 the Solem Court said that 
                                                                                                                          
Court also relied on legislative judgments in deciding whether the death penalty applied to the mentally 
retarded and youthful offenders, and whether a death sentence was proportional punishment.  
Considering both the number of states prohibiting the death penalty in these cases and the direction of 
change away from the death penalty for these offenders, the Court concluded that a national consensus 
had developed against the death penalty for these groups.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 
(2005) (establishing a national consensus by drawing parallels between state views regarding the 
execution of juveniles to the execution of mentally retarded people); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
316 (2002) (discussing the national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded individuals). 
199 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 888 (“[T]he seriousness of an offense is not a universal, 
timeless fact.”). 
200 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also infra notes 202–09, 229–31 and accompanying text. 
201 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003) (plurality opinion) (upholding a twenty-
five years to life sentence); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003) (upholding a fifty years to life 
sentence); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (plurality opinion) (affirming a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole). 
202 Professor Karlan offers three circumstances where a court might look behind the authorized 
punishment in a statute and find a sentence disproportionate to the crime—(1) where the sentence 
imposed on a particular defendant fits the letter but not the spirit of the law, (2) where the maximum 
penalty is not reliable because political pressures led the legislature to ratchet up the sentence, and (3) 
where the legislature criminalizes and punishes behavior that should not be punished.  Karlan, supra 
note 9, at 889–92. 
203 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the constitutional principle of 
proportionality in the Eighth Amendment has been recognized for almost a century.  Solem v. Helm, 
463 U. S. 277, 286–87 (1983). 
204 Id. at 287–88.  
205 Id. at 308 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. at 314.  
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proportionality analysis “should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences 
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”207  The 
Court asserted that courts can determine the relative gravity of an offense 
for purposes of proportionality by comparing the severity of different 
crimes on the basis of accepted criteria such as the harm caused or 
threatened and the culpability of the offender.208  Although the Court 
recognized that legislative judgments about the proper punishment for a 
criminal offense deserve substantial deference by the courts, the Solem 
majority viewed the Eighth Amendment as a limitation on the power of 
states to impose excessive punishment and that the determination of 
excessiveness could be based on objective criteria, not on the individual 
judgments of judges.209  
Applying the objective factors to the criminal sentence imposed on 
Helm—life imprisonment without eligibility for parole—the Court 
concluded that the sentence was significantly disproportionate to his crime 
and excessive under the Eighth Amendment.210  Helm was convicted of 
uttering a no account check for $100, an offense punishable by 
imprisonment up to five years.211  Because he had been previously 
convicted of six felonies, including three burglaries, all nonviolent 
according to the Court, he was sentenced under the recidivist statute to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.212  The Court characterized 
the bad check offense as a “passive felon[y]” that involved neither violence 
nor threat of violence.213  Although the Court recognized that recidivists 
may be punished more severely than first offenders, it emphasized that 
Helm’s “prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor.  All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a person.”214 
Comparing Helm’s sentence to other punishments, the Court 
concluded that in the same jurisdiction Helm had been punished as 
severely, or more severely, than criminals convicted of far more serious 
crimes, even taking into account his habitual offender status.215  Comparing 
his sentence to the sentence that could be imposed in other jurisdictions for 
the same crime, the Court found that Helm was punished more severely 
                                                                                                                          
207 Id. at 292. 
208 Id. at 292–93. 
209 Id. at 289–90. 
210 Id. at 303. 
211 Id. at 281.  
212 Id. at 279, 281–82.  
213 Id. at 296 (quoting State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, J., 
dissenting)).  
214 Id. at 296–97. 
215 Id. at 298–99. 
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than he would have been in almost any other state.216  Based on its 
application of the objective criteria it adopted, the Court concluded that 
Helm’s sentence was “significantly disproportionate” to his crime and thus 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.217 
Although the Court in Solem v. Helm articulated a test based on three 
“objective factors”218 similar to the guideposts utilized in punitive damage 
review cases, later decisions of the Court have modified the test so that the 
gravity of the offense has become the predominant factor.219  Eight years 
after Solem, in 1991, the Court in Harmelin v. Michigan affirmed a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the crime of possession of 
more than 650 grams of cocaine.220  The concurring opinion of Justice 
Kennedy modified the three-part proportionality test of Solem by adopting 
“gross[] disproportiona[lity]” as the focus of the excessiveness 
determination.221  Although Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion was 
joined by only two other justices, his approach was adopted by the 
majority in Ewing v. California, the Court’s latest decision addressing the 
excessiveness of a criminal sentence.222  Under that approach, if a sentence 
is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, no comparative 
analysis of that sentence with other sentences within or outside the 
jurisdiction is required.  As the concurring Justices put it, 
“intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in 
the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and 
the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”223  
In essence, the seriousness of the offense becomes the most important 
factor in the excessiveness determination.  In Justice Kennedy’s view, the 
seriousness of Harmelin’s crime, juxtaposed with his sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole, did not give rise to an inference of gross 
disproportionality requiring comparative analysis.224 
The proportionality test described in Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Harmelin provides for a deferential and limited review of 
criminal sentences for excessiveness.  This gross disproportionality test 
sets an almost impossible standard and forgoes, except in rare cases, any 
comparative analysis of the sentence to other sentences in the same 
jurisdiction or in other states.  Justice Kennedy relied on four principles to 
narrow the test adopted by the Court in Solem.  The first three principles all 
                                                                                                                          
216 Id. at 299–300. 
217 Id. at 303. 
218 Id. at 290. 
219 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 1004 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
220 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 996 (plurality opinion).  
221 Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
222 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14. 
223 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
224 Id. 
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involve substantial deference to legislatures with regard to the gravity of 
crimes and the punishment they deserve. 225 
These deferential principles almost entirely remove courts from any 
proportionality review of prison sentences.226  The fourth principle 
removes any doubt that courts should avoid reviewing criminal sentences.  
According to this principle, the lack of clear standards to distinguish 
between sentences for different terms of years means that challenges to 
prison sentences based on the Eighth Amendment will rarely succeed.227  
This principle reflects the concern that judges should not substitute their 
own judgments about the gravity of offenses and proper punishments and 
sit as a superlegislature.  Any review by courts, according to Justice 
Kennedy, should be informed by objective criteria,228 and the lack of 
objective standards for judging whether prison terms are excessive means 
that successful challenges will be rare.229  The restrictive proportionality 
test devised in Harmelin and applied in Ewing reflects the principles of 
deference to legislatures, federalism concerns, and the difficulty of judicial 
review. 
The dissent in Harmelin disagreed that judicial review of prison 
sentences lacked any objective standards, and it would have applied the 
Solem three-part test.230  Justice White, writing for the dissent, found 
objective criteria in both an intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional 
analysis, and stated that a determination of “gross disproportionality” 
based on an analysis of the gravity of the offense and severity of the 
penalty must include comparisons to the punishment of other crimes in the 
same jurisdiction or the same crime in other states.231  Otherwise, the 
Court’s proportionality judgment would “have no basis . . . other than the 
subjective views of individual judges . . . .”232  For the dissenters, the 
                                                                                                                          
225 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  First, “the fixing of prison terms 
for specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is properly 
within the province of legislatures, not courts.”  Id. at 998 (internal quotations omitted).  Second, this 
deference extends to the theories of punishment that the legislature chooses to adopt in setting the 
penalties for different crimes.  Id. at 999.  Legislatures may choose to give different weights to different 
goals of punishment such as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.  And third, 
federalism concerns support substantial deference to different judgments in different states about the 
severity of offenses and the punishment they deserve.  Id.  According to this third principle, the Court 
would accept different and harsher prison terms for particular crimes based on “differing attitudes and 
perceptions of local conditions.”  Id. at 1000. 
226 For one commentator’s argument that the approach taken by the Court in this case can be best 
understood as a rational scrutiny review of prison terms, similar to Fourteenth Amendment rationality 
scrutiny, see Michael P. O’Shea, Purposeless Restraints: Fourteenth Amendment Rationality Scrutiny 
and the Constitutional Review of Prison Sentences, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2005). 
227 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263, 272 (1980) (plurality opinion)). 
228 Id. at 1000. 
229 Id. at 1001. 
230 Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. at 1021. 
232 Id. at 1020. 
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Solem test provides the proper assistance to courts in determining whether 
a particular prison term is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.  Only 
by comparing sentences authorized for other crimes in the same state and 
sentences for the same crime in other states, “can a court begin to make an 
objective assessment about a given sentence’s constitutional 
proportionality.”233  Such comparisons are the best and most reliable 
evidence of the gravity of a particular offense and excessiveness of the 
sentence imposed.234 
In its latest decision reviewing a prison sentence under the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court in Ewing v. California used the Harmelin threshold 
test of gross proportionality instead of the Solem test.235  Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion was joined by two other justices, and it 
adopted and applied the principles articulated by Justice Kennedy in 
Harmelin.236  The Court’s opinion asserted that the Eighth Amendment 
contains a “narrow proportionality principle” in non-capital cases.237  
Applying these principles to the twenty-five years to life sentence imposed 
on Ewing pursuant to California’s three strikes law, the Court determined 
that this sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crime and his 
status as a recidivist.238  Ewing committed the crime of grand theft, a 
felony, by stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, and concealing them 
in his pants as he limped out of the store.239  Because he had previously 
been convicted of four serious or violent felonies—three burglaries and a 
robbery—he was sentenced under the three strikes law to a prison term of 
twenty-five years to life.240 
The Court upheld the sentence imposed on Ewing by giving substantial 
deference to the legislative policy reflected in the California three strikes 
law.  The plurality opinion stated that California made a deliberate policy 
choice that repeaters of serious or violent crimes must be isolated and that 
“[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be 
made by state legislatures, not federal courts.”241  Justice O’Connor 
concluded that recidivism has been recognized as a legitimate basis for 
increased punishment and that nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
California from incapacitating recidivists.242  She added that the Court does 
                                                                                                                          
233 Id. at 1021. 
234 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 893 (“[The] clearest and most reliable evidence of 
contemporary standards other than the authorized sentence is likely to involve how the defendant’s 
offense fits into the structure of the state’s penal code or how defendants convicted of similar offenses, 
either within or without the state, are being treated.”). 
235 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (plurality opinion).  
236 Id. at 23. 
237 Id. at 20. 
238 Id. at 30. 
239 Id. at 17.  
240 Id. at 18, 20.  
241 Id. at 25. 
242 Id. 
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not sit as a “superlegislature” to second-guess California’s policy 
choices.243 
Against this backdrop, the plurality opinion examined the gravity of 
Ewing’s offense and concluded that his offense of felony grand theft was a 
serious offense.244  In addition, the Court looked at the prior convictions 
that supported the three strikes law and found that each of them was a 
serious felony.245  Weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense in light of his 
history of recidivism against the long sentence imposed, the Court 
concluded that the sentence did not generate an inference of gross 
disproportionality.246  Because the prison term did not meet the threshold 
determination of gross disproportionality, the Court did not compare 
Ewing’s sentence with sentences for other crimes in California or with 
other sentences for the same conduct in other states.  
Significantly, the Harmelin_Ewing test was endorsed by only three 
justices in each case.247  Because two justices, Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
do not believe that the Eighth Amendment includes any kind of 
proportionality review of prison terms,248 their two votes supported 
decisions in those cases rejecting a determination of excessiveness.  The 
four justices who dissented in Ewing considered Ewing’s sentence under 
the plurality’s terms without adopting the test of the plurality,249 finding 
that his sentence was grossly disproportional to his crime, even considering 
his prior record.250  The dissenters rejected the view that reliance on any 
theory of punishment, like incapacitation based on a record of recidivism, 
could insulate a sentence from being excessive under the Eighth 
Amendment,251 and concluded that recidivism plays a relevant, but not 
determinative role in the proportionality analysis.252  According to the 
dissenters, the crime of conviction, here the theft of golf clubs, must be the 
focus of the review even in cases involving recidivist offenders.253  With 
this focus, the dissenters found the theft offense triggering the sentence to 
be “among the less serious, while the punishment is among the most 
                                                                                                                          
243 Id. at 28. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 30. 
246 Id. 
247 In Harmelin, Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter joined Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  In Ewing, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion.  Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003) (plurality opinion).  
248 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment does 
not include any kind of proportionality review of prison terms); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(same). 
249 Id. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. at 37. 
251 Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
252 Id. at 41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
253 Id. 
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serious.”254  Thus they required intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional 
comparisons with Ewing’s sentence.  These comparisons disclosed that in 
California alone, nonrecidivist first degree murder carried the sentence 
imposed on Ewing,255 but that outside California a recidivist convicted of 
the crime committed by Ewing would not be so severely punished.256  The 
dissent’s comparison of Ewing’s case with two other recidivist cases 
decided by the Court, Rummel and Solem, placed Ewing’s case closer to 
Solem, in which the Court found the sentence excessive under the Eighth 
Amendment.257 
In a companion case to Ewing, the Court upheld a sentence of fifty-
years-to-life (two consecutive twenty-five-years-to-life terms) under the 
California three strikes law.  In Lockyer v. Andrade, the defendant was 
convicted of two felonies for stealing videotapes from a Kmart store on 
two different occasions by concealing them in his waistband; the first 
group of tapes he stole was worth $84.70 and the second group was worth 
$68.84.258  Because he had a prior conviction, the two thefts could be 
charged under California law as felonies rather than as petty thefts.259  And 
because Andrade had been previously convicted of three counts of first-
degree residential burglary, he was sentenced under the three strikes law 
for each theft.260 
The Court reviewed the federal habeas corpus challenge to Andrade’s 
sentence under the limited review mandated by Congress.261  According to 
the Court, the question was not whether the state court erred in affirming 
the sentence but rather whether the California Court of Appeals’ decision 
was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.262  
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor concluded that it was not 
“objectively unreasonable” for the California Court of Appeals to affirm 
the fifty-years-to-life sentence in view of the lack of clarity of the federal 
law on the proportionality limits on prison sentences.263  The Court stated 
that its precedents in this area have not established a clear or consistent 
path for courts to follow and that its cases exhibit a lack of clarity 
regarding what factors may indicate gross disproportionality.264  As a 
result, according to the Court, the unclear governing legal principle 
regarding the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment “gives 
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255 Id. at 44. 
256 Id. at 47. 
257 Id. at 39. 
258 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003). 
259 Id. at 67. 
260 Id. at 68. 
261 Id. at 70–71 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)). 
262 Id. at 71. 
263 Id. at 76. 
264 Id. at 72. 
 2008] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 147 
legislatures broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the scope 
of the proportionality principle—the ‘precise contours’ of which ‘are 
unclear.’”265 
The Supreme Court in Ewing and Andrade essentially abandoned any 
attempt to measure the proportionality of increased punishment for 
recidivist criminals.  Although noting that increased sentences for repeat 
criminals have long been recognized by the Court,266 the Supreme Court 
failed to articulate at what point an increased sentence for recidivism is 
excessive relative to the underlying crime or the prior criminal history.267  
Instead, the Court used a “gross disproportionality” test and deferred to the 
legislature’s goal of incapacitating recidivists.  This approach essentially 
insulates habitual offender sentence enhancements from proportionality 
review.  As long as the legislature has articulated incapacitation as a penal 
goal, recidivist sentencing appears to be beyond proportionality review and 
insulated from an excessiveness challenge.268 
Because proportionality largely depends on the gravity of the conduct 
to be punished, when prior criminal behavior is used as an enhancement, it 
has the potential to distort the proportion between the crime committed and 
the punishment imposed.269  Repeated criminal conduct reflects an 
aggravating factor that may be taken into account in measuring 
punishment.270  Generally, retribution principles determine the outer limits 
of punishment for a crime and aggravating factors like recidivism justify 
punishment at the upper end of the maximum.271  If past conduct can be 
used to impose a penalty in excess of the maximum for the offense, the 
enhancement must still bear some relationship to the crime committed.  
Without fixing the enhancement to the crime of conviction, the past 
misconduct becomes the determinant factor for the punishment and the 
                                                                                                                          
265 Id. at 76 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
266 See Erik G. Luna, Foreward: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 58–64 
(1998) (discussing Supreme Court cases leading to the three-strikes debate). 
267 See Andrus, supra note 71, at 293 (“[T]he plurality failed to delineate when an increased 
recidivist sentence . . . constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
268 For possible ways to determine how much more severely recidivists can be punished, see, for 
example, Karlan, supra note 9, at 896–97 (offering three solutions to the questions of how much more 
severely recidivists can be punished: (1) defer to the legislature’s decision about the appropriate 
enhancement for recidivists; (2) compare how recidivists are treated in other jurisdictions and reject 
outliers; and (3) judges make the decision themselves). 
269 See Andrus, supra note 71, at 294 for combinations of triggering offenses and criminal 
histories that illustrate the difficulty of determining the proportionality of recidivist sentences.  The 
most troublesome situations—(1) a minor offense and substantial criminal history and (2) a serious 
offense and a minor criminal history—create the possibility of the past misconduct requiring a sentence 
out of line with the seriousness of the underlying crime. 
270 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 896 (“[It is] plausible that there is a widely shared consensus 
that people who have demonstrated a propensity to commit offenses are more blameworthy than first-
time offenders.”). 
271 See Frase, Limiting Retribution, supra note 73, at 90–104; see also, supra notes 54–59 and 
accompanying text. 
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punishment loses it moorings to the principles of retribution.  Past 
misconduct cannot assume a predominant role in sentencing without 
subverting the proportion between the crime of conviction and the penalty.  
To preserve proportionality in the recidivist context, any enhancement 
based on criminal history should be proportional to the crime of 
conviction. 
In evaluating the excessiveness of a recidivist sentence, the focus 
therefore must be on the triggering offense with past misconduct playing a 
relevant but not a determinative role in the proportionality analysis.  If the 
underlying crime is minor and the criminal history is long and serious, or if 
the crime is serious and the criminal history is minor, the role of the 
criminal history should be limited.  Prior misconduct, in the first scenario, 
should not result in a harsh sentence out of line with the seriousness of the 
underlying minor crime.  Similarly, the lack of a substantial criminal past 
should not minimize the punishment for a serious offense.  To be true to 
proportionality principles in these two recidivist scenarios, the triggering 
offense must be accorded the predominant role. 
The Supreme Court’s proportionality decisions in the criminal context 
reveal an unwillingness to find criminal sentences excessive under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.  The decisions show extreme 
deference to the legislative judgments regarding both the amount of 
punishment and the punishment goal.  The adoption of a standard of gross 
proportionality, a standard that is almost impossible to meet, reflects the 
Court’s substantial deference to legislative judgments and the importance 
of legislative limits in the proportionality analysis. 
VI.  FORFEITURE AND PROPORTIONALITY 
The Supreme Court’s proportionality analysis in reviewing punitive 
forfeitures resembles its approach to assessing punitive damages and 
differs from its approach to reviewing criminal sanctions, primarily due to 
the absence of legislative limits on the dollar amount subject to forfeiture.  
In the forfeiture context, the Court does not defer to the legislative 
determination that any property involved in the offense can be forfeited.  
Instead, it undertakes its own analysis of the seriousness of the conduct and 
the proportionality of the forfeited amount to the gravity of the conduct. 
Where forfeiture of property is punishment for an offense, it is subject 
to the proportionality requirement of the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment.  The Court in United States v. Bajakajian adopted a 
gross proportionality test for punitive forfeitures—the same test used in 
determining whether a criminal prison sentence is excessive under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.272  Applying this test to the 
                                                                                                                          
272 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998). 
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forfeiture of $357,144 for the crime of willful failure to report the 
transporting of currency in excess of $10,000, the Court found that the 
offense was not very serious in view of the fact that it is solely a reporting 
offense,273 its violation by the defendant did not involve any other illegal 
activities,274 and any harm caused was minimal.275  In addition, the Court 
noted that the maximum fine for this offense under the Sentencing 
Guidelines was $5000.276  Comparing the gravity of the defendant’s 
offense to the forfeiture of $357,144, the Court found the forfeited amount 
was grossly disproportional to the offense.277 
The Court limited its proportionality review of forfeitures to those that 
involve punishment based on in personam criminal forfeitures following 
conviction of a crime.278  It excluded from the reach of the Excessive Fines 
Clause both civil in rem forfeitures279 and forfeitures that are remedial and 
not punitive in nature.280  It concluded the forfeiture of the currency 
involved in the failure to report offense constituted punishment because the 
forfeiture was predicated on the commission of this offense in personam 
and forfeiture was a sanction authorized upon conviction.281 
The dissent would have accepted the Congressional decision to require 
the forfeiture of the full amount of currency involved in the reporting 
violation.  According to the dissent, Congress fixed the fine for this offense 
as a fine plus forfeiture of all the currency.282  Moreover, the dissent 
faulted the majority opinion for not granting any deference, much less 
substantial deference, to the decision of Congress to authorize full 
forfeiture of the currency.283 Addressing the gravity of the offense, the 
dissent viewed it as serious, justifying the forfeiture of all of the cash 
carried by the defendant.284 
The crux of the case seems to turn on the question of limits on the 
dollar value of the property to be forfeited.  The dissent viewed the 
forfeiture statute as imposing a limit on punishment by forfeiture—a 
person cannot forfeit more than the full amount of the property involved in 
                                                                                                                          
273 Id. at 337. 
274 Id. at 337–38. 
275 Id. at 339. 
276 Id. at 338. 
277 Id. at 339 n.14, 340 (acknowledging that the maximum fine in the statute was $250,000, but 
discounting this maximum and stating that the maximum would apply only to more serious violations 
of the statute). 
278 Id. at 332. 
279 Id. at 331. 
280 Id. at 329. 
281 Id. at 328. 
282 Id. at 350 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the fine is to be doubled when the reporting 
offense is committed while violating another law of the United States) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) 
(2000)). 
283 Id. at 348. 
284 Id. at 348, 351. 
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the reporting violation.285  Congress limited the forfeiture punishment to 
the value of the property and did not authorize forfeiture of anything more.  
The majority, on the other hand, did not seem to think that Congress 
imposed any limit on the amount or value of the property subject to 
forfeiture.  Because the amount of the currency involved in a reporting 
violation can vary widely, from $10,001 to millions of dollars, the majority 
was unwilling to permit forfeitures of substantial sums without a 
proportionality assessment of the amount forfeited to the gravity of the 
offense. 
The statutory language requiring forfeiture of “any property . . . 
involved in such offense,”286 authorizes punishment without any dollar 
limit.  In essence, Congress did not make a judgment about the limits of the 
amount that could be forfeited or about the appropriate punishment for 
violation of this offense.  The forfeiture statute, therefore, permits different 
punishment of offenders who commit the same offense based on the 
amount of money involved and without regard to any differences in 
culpability.  For example, the person who fails to report $20,000 is 
punished by forfeiture of $20,000 whereas the person who fails to report 
$5 million is punished by a forfeiture of $5 million.  If there is nothing 
except the amount of the currency to distinguish the two offenders, the 
difference in punishment has no relationship to the gravity of the offense. 
The majority in Bajakajian subjected the punishment of forfeiture to 
the proportionality principle.  The Court adopted the standard of gross 
disproportionality, rejecting a test of strict proportionality due to the 
difficulty of determining the gravity of an offense, a determination the 
Court described as inherently imprecise.287  Although it borrowed this 
standard from the Court’s proportionality cases in the context of prison 
sentences, the Court in Bajakajian did not adopt the entire test articulated 
in Harmelin and reaffirmed in Ewing.  In those cases, the plurality opinions 
used gross disproportionality as a threshold test, and if the prison sentence 
met that test, then the review should proceed to compare the sentence with 
the punishment authorized for other crimes in the same jurisdiction and 
with the punishment for the same crime in other jurisdictions.288  The 
majority opinion by Justice Thomas made no mention of a threshold as part 
of the proportionality test for punitive forfeitures. 
The majority opinion, however, as part of its evaluation of the 
seriousness of the offense, used an intrajurisdictional analysis and looked 
at other punishments imposed for the same violation in other parts of the 
                                                                                                                          
285 Id. at 348–49. 
286 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2000). 
287 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998). 
288 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338. 
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federal code.289  Specifically, the Court looked at the prison sentence and 
fine that could be imposed for violation of the currency reporting offense.  
It noted that under the sentencing guidelines the maximum fine that could 
be imposed on Bajakajian was $5000 and the maximum sentence was six 
months imprisonment.290  These other penalties for the offense, according 
to the Court, “confirm a minimal level of culpability.”291  The Court 
rejected the statutory maximum of five years imprisonment and a $250,000 
fine for violation of the currency reporting statute292 in assessing the 
gravity of the offense, and instead relied on the lower Sentencing 
Guidelines penalties of six months and a $5000 fine.  The Court stated that 
the penalties authorized by the sentencing guidelines “undercut any 
argument based solely on the statute, because they show that respondent’s 
culpability relative to other potential violators of the reporting provision—
tax evaders, drug kingpins, or money launderers, for example—is small 
indeed.”293 
Comparing the amount forfeited to the maximum fine under the 
sentencing guidelines, the Court concluded that the forfeiture of $357,144 
exceeded the fine of $5000 by “many orders of magnitude.”294  This 
comparison resembles the ratio analysis used by the Court in the punitive 
damages proportionality review, although the Court in Bajakajian did not 
state that any ratios between the amount forfeited and the fine would be 
presumptively disproportionate. 
The proportionality review in the forfeiture area also resembles the 
punitive damages analysis in the Court’s willingness to make its own 
judgment about the gravity of the conduct subject to punishment.  Without 
guidance from Congress as to the dollar limit of the property to be 
forfeited, the Court was free to use its own judgment as to the seriousness 
of the offense and the amount proportional to the offense.  The absence of 
limits in the forfeiture statute meant that the Court had to engage in a more 
active proportionality review and could not rely on a legislative judgment 
regarding the appropriate amount of punishment for the offense.  
VII.  THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGISLATIVE LIMITS IN PROPORTIONALITY 
ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the Supreme Court’s proportionality decisions in the 
contexts of punitive damages, criminal sanctions, and forfeitures presented 
                                                                                                                          
289 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 9, at 901 (“In deciding how culpable Bajakajian was, the Court 
looked to the harshness of other punishments imposed for the same conduct in other parts of the U.S. 
Code and contemplated by the sentencing guidelines—a species of intrajurisdictional analysis.”). 
290 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338. 
291 Id. at 339. 
292 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2000). 
293 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339 n.14. 
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in this Article demonstrates the importance of legislative limits on 
punishment in the proportionality analysis.  Where the legislature has set 
caps on punishment, the Court defers to the legislative caps.  Where the 
legislature has not set limits on the amount of punishment, the Court 
undertakes a more active role in determining the proportionality of the 
punishment to the gravity of the conduct being punished.  This active 
judicial role in the absence of legislative limits includes a willingness by 
the Court to make its own judgment about the seriousness of the conduct to 
be punished, and a willingness to set its own caps on punishment, 
especially in the area of punitive damages. 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has analyzed the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding punishment in the contexts of the death penalty, 
criminal imprisonment, and fines and forfeitures and concluded that the 
Court’s approaches to punishment in these different contexts are 
inconsistent and unjustifiable.295  Chemerinsky says that the Court itself 
has not recognized its inconsistent approaches or made any attempt to 
reconcile its decisions.296  He argues that the differences in the 
proportionality analysis for the different punishments cannot be justified 
by the language in the Constitution, its history, or social policy.297 
Professor Chemerinsky pays scant attention to the factor that best 
reconciles the different approaches—the presence or absence of legislative 
limits on punishment.  Although Chemerinsky sees the relevance of 
legislative choice in the determination of punishment, especially with 
regard to social policy, he ignores the importance of limits on punishment.  
He sees a legislature’s refusal to impose limits on punitive damages as the 
equivalent of a legislature’s decision to punish the criminal recidivist more 
severely.298  However, the absence of limits on punishment does not 
necessarily reflect a policy choice to permit open-ended punishment.  A 
legislature’s non-action on the issue of limits at best reflects no legislative 
judgment on the issue.  The absence of a legislative limit on punishment 
violates an important principle of just punishment and the rule of law—
notice of the consequences for wrongful conduct and a community 
judgment as to the just deserts for that wrongdoing.299 
                                                                                                                          
295 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1063 
(2004) (arguing that justification for the Court’s inconsistency in its approach to punishment is 
unsatisfactory). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 1067. 
298 Id. at 1065 (“Is it that there is a pressing social need for deferring to legislative choices for 
recidivist sentences, but not to a legislature’s refusal to impose limits on punitive damages?”). 
299 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose.”); see also Zipursky, supra note 9, at 171 (stating “fundamental constitutional values and rule-
of-law values” demand notice and limits to punishment). 
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Professor Pamela S. Karlan has also studied the Supreme Court’s 
proportionality decisions in the criminal and civil contexts and addresses 
what she calls the seeming tension in the Court’s approach to constitutional 
limits on sentences and punitive damages.300  She concludes that the 
differences in criminal and civil litigation may explain the Court’s retreat 
from proportionality review in the criminal context and its enthusiastic 
embrace of proportionality in punitive damages cases.301  Karlan notes that 
punitive damages pose different federalism concerns, and that review of 
punitive damages involves a different level of federal intrusion.  
Federalism concerns, she suggests, may explain the Court’s increasingly 
robust review of punitive damages.302  The difference in federal intrusion 
in criminal and civil cases, she argues, may also incline the Court toward a 
more active excessiveness review in punitive damages cases.303  This 
difference, she argues, means that the Court’s proportionality decisions in 
the civil arena will not spawn collateral litigation in the federal courts and 
clog the federal courts as proportionality decisions in criminal cases 
would.304 
Professor Karlan’s most persuasive explanation for the Court’s 
different jurisprudence rests on the different role of juries in the criminal 
and civil contexts.  The power of criminal juries to punish, she points out, 
is limited in two ways—by the legislatively enacted maximum and by the 
                                                                                                                          
300 Karlan, supra note 9, at 920 (observing that the Court’s decisions “with respect to 
constitutional limits on sentences and damages seem at first in some tension with one another”). 
301 Id. at 920 (“Differences between the two kinds of litigation may, however, explain why 
proportionality review is relatively more attractive in punitive damages cases.”). 
302 Id. (“[P]unitive damages cases may raise reverse federalism concerns that are absent from 
criminal prosecutions.”).  The federalism concern arises from the possibility of impermissibly 
punishing a defendant for conduct committed outside of the state’s jurisdiction.  In the criminal context, 
states are limited in their territorial reach, but punitive damages awards pose a risk that a defendant 
may be punished for extraterritorial conduct.  Id. at 913 (“[T]here is a significant territorial limitation 
on the reach of a state’s power.  This territorial limitation seems to have caused relatively little 
constitutional litigation in the criminal arena.  But the recent punitive damages cases before the Court 
have involved an extraterritorial dimension.”).  The Court expressed this concern in State Farm and 
limited the permissible use of out-of-state conduct by the defendant.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (“Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in 
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
303 Karlan, supra note 9, at 920 (“[T]he Supreme Court may think the level of federal intrusion 
can be better controlled in the civil context.”).  Whereas criminal sentences are subject to federal court 
intervention through federal habeas corpus or direct appeal to the Supreme Court, federal review of 
punitive damages is limited to the Supreme Court on appeal from state courts.  Id. at 910 (“As Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out, while criminal sentences in state prosecutions can be challenged in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings as well as on direct appeal, the Supreme Court will be the only federal court 
policing the area of punitive damages . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted). 
304 Id. at 911 (“[O]ne of the disadvantages of the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle was 
the possibility that it could have spawned wholesale collateral litigation, clogging federal court 
dockets.”).  Because the Court would need only to police state court awards of punitive damages, and 
not lower federal courts, the Supreme Court, Karlan suggests, may feel freer to engage in a strict 
proportionality review of punitive damages.  Id. 
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prosecutor’s charging decision.305  The civil jury has neither of these 
constraints in the absence of statutory caps on punitive damages.306  As a 
result, civil juries do not exercise “their discretion within a carefully 
defined sphere.”307  Although this explanation focuses on the different 
roles of juries in criminal and civil cases, the real crux is the importance of 
legislative limits on punishment more than the role of juries. 
VIII.  LEGISLATIVE LIMITS V. JURY VERDICTS 
The absence of any limits on punitive damages means that the 
punishment is open-ended, unlike criminal punishment with set maxima.  
Because a jury has no limit on the amount of punitive damages it can 
award, the Supreme Court has imposed a more active proportionality 
analysis to determine whether an award is excessive.  The development of 
guideposts and allowable evidence reflects the Court’s concern about the 
need for imposing limits on punitive damages.  In the context of criminal 
imprisonment, the Court has a legislative judgment about the proper 
proportion of punishment deserved.  The Court is unwilling to disagree 
with the legislative judgment concerning the maximum punishment for a 
crime and defers to the legislature’s authorized punishment unless in a 
particular case the authorized punishment is way out of line, like the 
sentence in Solem, or like the example of life imprisonment for repeated 
parking violations. 
Several features of a legislative judgment on the proper punishment for 
criminal conduct explain why courts accord substantial deference to 
legislative decisions regarding punishment.308  Judgments about the 
severity of a crime or the reprehensibility of conduct are often the subject 
of disagreement.309  When a legislature draws punishment distinctions 
based on its moral judgments, or those of the electorate, judges 
understandably are reluctant to reject those judgments.  If judges disagree 
with the legislative decision regarding severity, they appear to be 
substituting their own moral judgment and to be doing so without any 
objective standard.310  Given the lack of objective criteria in measuring 
                                                                                                                          
305 Id. at 919 (noting that in criminal cases the “jury’s ability to punish is constrained by a 
legislatively enacted statutory maximum,” and by the “politically accountable decision about the 
defendant’s potential punishment when the prosecutor makes her charging decision”). 
306 Id. (“By contrast, in the absence of statutory ratio limits or damages caps, civil juries are not 
constrained by legislative or executive decisions.”). 
307 Id. at 920 (“[Civil juries] are not exercising their discretion within a carefully defined 
sphere.”). 
308 According to Professor Zipursky, the legislative framework within which a criminal fine is 
located normally demands such a high level of deference that courts decline to do a substantive 
proportionality review under the Excessive Fines Clause.  Zipursky, supra note 9, at 164. 
309 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1957, 1958 (2004) (“People often bitterly disagree about how severe various crimes are.”). 
310 Id. at 1978. 
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crime severity, and the fact that notions of reprehensibility involve moral 
judgments, legislatures are better situated to make these judgments.311  
Deference to legislatures avoids conflicts between the judiciary and the 
legislature and leaves difficult line-drawing to the legislature.312 
Although it has been argued that a jury’s verdict is entitled to the same 
deference as given to legislative judgments,313 the two judgments differ in 
significant ways.  First, the legislative decision as to the proper punishment 
sets the maximum penalty that can be imposed for a particular crime.  In 
addition, it reflects a policy choice of the community.  And third, the 
maximum penalty applies to all offenders.  Since jury awards lack these 
features, they do not command the same deference given to legislative 
decisions.314  The jury award does not reflect a broad community judgment 
about the wrongfulness of the conduct or of the proper measure of 
punishment deserved.  Juries do not bring the same considerations to their 
punishment decision that legislators do in their punishment legislation.  
Juries do not consider the range of other wrongful conduct and how 
different misconduct deserves different punishment.  The jury has only the 
case before it, and its award does not establish the punishment for similar 
conduct, or even for the same conduct that is the subject of another lawsuit 
by a different plaintiff.  Two juries deciding the same case but with 
different plaintiffs can come up with different punitive damages awards.  
In short, a jury does not speak for the community in a way that applies 
beyond the parties in the case.  More important, the jury has no limits on 
its discretion in setting the amount of the punitive damages award. 
Arguments that the jury system provides the best mechanism for 
determining fair punishment315 miss the point that juries are not subject to 
defined limits.  Even if one concedes that juries are better than judges in 
assessing the degree of reprehensibility and in measuring the appropriate 
punishment in a particular case,316 this concession does not address the 
principle objection that the amount of punishment must be subject to 
                                                                                                                          
311 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 504 (arguing that because “proportionality determinations 
require inherently subjective comparisons of sentence severity with offense seriousness,” such 
comparisons “should be left to legislatures, which are institutionally better positioned to determine the 
seriousness of a given offense”). 
312 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 309, at 1981 (“Deference avoids conflicts with legislators and 
citizens who firmly and plausibly argue that certain crimes are extremely serious, and who resent 
seeing those crimes treated as less constitutionally significant than other crimes.”). 
313 See Chemerinsky, supra note 295, at 1069 (noting that in the area of punitive damages, the 
Court has not shown deference to the jury). 
314 Id. (observing that individually driven punitive damages awards do not generally arrive within 
the protective clothing that a legislative process delivers). 
315 See, e.g., Zwier, supra note 6, at 439 (stating that jurors are best able to express the values of 
their community with regard to the complex value and moral judgments required by the nature of 
punitive damages). 
316 Professor Zwier argues that juries rather than judges are superior decision makers with regard 
to punitive damages.  Id. at 428. 
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limits.  Faith in the jury system does not mean that juries may operate 
without any standards or constraints.  Rule of law demands constraints on 
participants in the legal system, whether they be judges or juries.  To say 
that punitive damages should be subject to legislative limits does not reject 
a role for juries in determining punitive damages.  The same reasons that 
make juries especially well-suited to decide issues like reasonableness in 
tort cases and degrees of culpability in criminal cases make them well-
suited to decide whether punitive damages are warranted, and, subject to 
legislative limits, in what amount. 
It is not a distrust of juries that explains the difference in the 
proportionality review of punitive damages and criminal sentences.  It is, 
rather, the absence of a limit on punitive damages that matters.  There is 
nothing in Supreme Court decisions suggesting that the same punitive 
damages awards in BMW and State Farm, had they been awarded by a 
judge rather than a jury, would have been approved by the Supreme Court.  
Whether the amount of the award is determined by a judge or jury, the 
same concern for proportionality of award to wrongful conduct applies.  
The same guidepost analysis would apply, and the analysis would not 
require any deference to either judge or jury. 
Jury instructions do not substitute for limits on the amount of punitive 
damages. Although instructions play a valuable role in guiding the jury’s 
determination of the punishment that the misconduct deserves and can 
focus the jury on the relevant factors that affect the amount of 
punishment,317 jury instructions do not limit the amount of a punitive 
damages award in the absence of a cap.318  Without a cap, no jury 
instruction would prevent a jury from giving a huge punitive damages 
award that a proportionality evaluation would regard as excessive.  Even 
though the jury based its award on its judgment of the reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s conduct, its verdict does not necessarily reflect a societal 
judgment about the wrongfulness of the conduct. 
IX.  SETTING LEGISLATIVE LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
A legislature can of course set limits on punitive damages as many 
states have done.  These caps, however, do not operate like the statutory 
maxima on imprisonment found in criminal codes.  Generally, existing 
caps apply to all punitive damages awards without regard to the particular 
                                                                                                                          
317 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007) (requiring state courts 
to provide juries with guidance on the proper use of evidence of harm to others in determining punitive 
damages).  
318 The Supreme Court, after reviewing punitive damages pattern jury instructions from Maryland 
and Alabama, expressed skepticism about jury instructions as insurance against unpredictable outlier 
awards.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219, slip. op. at 31 (U.S. June 25, 2008).   
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misconduct justifying punitive damages.319  A few states have enacted 
several caps on punitive damages depending on the nature of the wrongful 
conduct.320  By contrast, almost all state criminal codes rank different 
crimes in terms of their reprehensibility and assign different maxima 
according to the ranking, with the more severe punishments assigned to the 
most serious crimes. 
A state could use the criminal code model and impose different caps 
for different types of misconduct just as it authorizes different terms of 
imprisonment for different crimes.321  A legislature might use a multiplier 
of compensatory damages to set the upper limit of punitive damages, or it 
might select a dollar maximum.  For example, in contract cases, a state 
legislature could decide to cap punitive damages at double or triple the 
amount of the compensatory damages.  For fraud cases, the limit could be 
set at twenty times the value of the property obtained by fraud up to a 
maximum of $5 million.  For injury or death cases, a legislature might 
decide to limit punitive damages to thirty times the compensatory damages 
or $20 million, whichever is higher.  These limits would reflect society’s 
judgments about the right proportion of punishment to misconduct, and 
juries would be free to award punitive damages in particular cases up to the 
limit.322  Different caps for different types of misconduct should result in 
less disparity among punitive damages awards by prohibiting the extreme 
verdict. 
Caps on punitive damages need not be so limiting as to prohibit multi-
million dollar verdicts.  If a state legislature considered certain conduct 
especially reprehensible and deserving of a large punitive damages awards 
in the range of $100 million, it could authorize punitive damages up to that 
amount.  Although a jury verdict of $100 million could be challenged on 
proportionality grounds, the award could be defended as proportional 
based on the legislative judgment as to the appropriate punishment policy 
choice and the right proportion of punishment to misconduct as reflected in 
                                                                                                                          
319 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (2003) (applying its cap of $350,000 to all punitive 
damage awards); see also Rustad, Iron Cage, supra note 6, at 1346 (“Virginia’s cap for total punitive 
damages is set at $350,000.”). 
320 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (2003) (establishing a general cap of $500,000 and a higher cap 
of $1,500,000 if the claim involved physical injuries); Fla. Stat. §§ 768.73(1)(a)(1)–(2) (2002) 
(establishing a general cap of $500,000, a higher cap of $2,000,000 if the defendant’s conduct was 
unreasonably dangerous or produced an unreasonable monetary gain, and no cap if the defendant 
specifically intended to harm the plaintiff and in fact harmed the plaintiff). 
321 Several commentators have suggested different limits on punitive damage awards based on 
different factors.  See, e.g., Jiang, supra note 9, at 813–20 (proposing guidelines similar to the federal 
sentencing guidelines for federal crimes for the determination of the proper amount of punitive 
damages to be awarded); Christopher Price, MPDLS Is Not a Disease: A Proposition for a Model 
Punitive Damage Limiting Statute In Light of the Constitutional Guideposts From BMW and State 
Farm, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 33, 54–56 (2004) (proposing a general cap for most cases and a higher 
cap when the defendant’s conduct results in death or permanent and debilitating physical injury). 
322 Whether juries should be informed about the cap raises an interesting question that is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 158 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:109 
the cap.  Just as the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of twenty-five-years-
to-life under the California three strikes law by according substantial 
deference to the legislative judgment that repeat offenders should be 
incapacitated and sentenced up to life imprisonment,323 it could defer to a 
legislative judgment about the proper amount of punitive damages for 
wrongful conduct and respect jury awards within the statutory cap.  
Legislative caps that are supported by reasoned penal policy choices 
addressing particular concerns in a state after debate and legislative 
hearings would likely be respected by the courts.  Such a deliberative 
process would make the legislative determination of the proper proportion 
more supportable as a reasonable judgment, a judgment that courts will be 
less likely or less willing to reject or second-guess. 
An example illustrates how a state might justify a high cap on punitive 
damages awards in particular types of cases.  Suppose that a rash of deaths 
in hospitals and nursing homes in the state leads to legislative hearings on 
the problem.  As a result of these hearings, the legislature learns that many 
of these deaths occurred as result of calculated decisions on the part of the 
hospitals and nursing homes to cut costs.  The legislature decides that such 
conduct is extremely serious and reprehensible and it should be both 
punished and deterred.  The legislature decides to deal with the problem by 
authorizing both criminal and civil penalties.  It enacts a criminal provision 
making such conduct a serious felony subject to ten years of imprisonment 
and a provision authorizing any victim of such conduct to recover punitive 
damages up to $100 million.  If a punitive damages award in the amount of 
$100 million in such a case is challenged as excessive, the Supreme Court 
would be hard pressed to find the award excessive, even if the 
compensatory damages were minimal.  The legislative judgment about the 
proper amount of punishment, both in criminal imprisonment and in 
punitive damages, should be accorded substantial deference based on this 
record.  Moreover, this is not an extreme example similar to the one 
hypothesized by the Supreme Court where a legislature makes “overtime 
parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”324 
The imprimatur of legislative authorization, however, does not insulate 
a high punitive damages award from judicial scrutiny for excessiveness.  
Given “the vagueness and contestability of the concept of 
proportionality,”325 courts generally should defer to the legislative 
judgment, yet cases will arise where the courts will need to set the outer 
limits of punitive damages that a legislature can authorize.  An award 
within the cap should be entitled to a presumption of validity based on 
                                                                                                                          
323 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). 
324 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
325 See Lee, supra note 52, at 744; Volokh, supra note 309, at 1958 (“People often bitterly 
disagree about how severe various crimes are.”). 
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judicial deference to the legislative determination of the proper 
punishment,326 and only when the authorized punishment is out of line with 
retributive notions of proportionality should courts step in and limit the 
punishment.327   
The judiciary has a role in evaluating the excessiveness of punishment 
when the legislature has spoken, but it is a limited role.328  Courts cannot 
abdicate their responsibility for judging the proportionality of 
punishment,329 and they cannot go to the other extreme and second-guess 
the legislative determination of proper punishment.  Perhaps the most that 
can be expected is for courts generally to defer to the legislature and to 
“prick the lines”330 at the margins between proportional and excessive 
punishment. 
Reviewing punitive damages for excessiveness in the absence of 
legislative limits places the Supreme Court in a difficult position.  It must 
make a determination as to the proportionality of a punitive damages 
award without any guidance from the legislature as to the appropriate 
amount of punishment for the conduct at issue.  It would be easier for the 
Court to review the award knowing what the state, through its 
representatives, authorized as the maximum amount of punishment.  What 
a jury in a particular case determined to be the appropriate damages, or 
what an appellate court considered to be proportional, does not convey the 
same societal judgment about the proportionality of punishment to 
misconduct and does not command the same deference that a legislative 
judgment does. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
The proportionality analysis adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court for criminal sanctions differs significantly from its review of jury 
awards of punitive damages.  Whereas the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages has become the focus of proportionality review in 
punitive damage cases, the reprehensibility factor has become the focus of 
                                                                                                                          
326 See Lee, supra note 52, at 744 (commenting that due to “the vagueness and contestability of 
the concept of proportionality,” courts should generally defer to legislatures in this realm). 
327 Id. at 744–45 (arguing that courts should not defer to the legislature when necessary to protect 
defendants from a discrete and insular minority). 
328 Id. at 744. 
329 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 309, at 1982 (“It is probably wrong to say that courts should 
never draw constitutional lines distinguishing crimes based on their severity.”).  Professor Volokh 
suggests ways for drawing lines based on crime severity and analyzes the problems with a line-drawing 
model.  Id. at 1983 (“[C]riticisms of constitutional line-drawing in this area have no considerable 
force.”). 
330 Karlan, supra note 9, at 880 (“[Courts] have said, we will not define due process of law.  We 
will leave it to be ‘pricked out’ by a process of inclusion and exclusion in individual cases.”); id. at 920 
(“[T]he Court may still be merely ‘pricking the lines’ when it comes to the question of when sentences 
are excessive or punitive damages are grossly disproportionate . . . .”). 
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proportionality analysis in review of criminal sentences and forfeitures that 
punish.  In evaluating whether a criminal sentence is excessive, the Court 
defers to the legislative judgments on penal policy, gravity of offenses, and 
the severity of punishment.  Because the legislature has spoken on these 
issues and has set limits on criminal punishment, the Court is unwilling to 
say that a particular prison term within the statutory limits is excessive.  
For punishment without legislative limits, however, the Court is less 
constrained in evaluating the proportionality of punishment.  Reversing a 
jury verdict of punitive damages for excessiveness does not involve the 
Court challenging a previously set limit on the amount of punitive 
damages.  Instead, the Court reviews a jury award that was not subject to 
any limits. 
Because the proportionality analysis depends on a judgment 
concerning the relative seriousness of the defendant’s unlawful act, and 
legislative judgments regarding the proper amount of punishment ascribed 
to different conduct reflect the community’s view of proportional 
punishment, legislatures should set limits on the amount of punitive 
damages that juries can award.  Legislatures need not and should not leave 
the proportionality judgment solely to the courts.  Legislatures can decide 
that different misconduct deserves different limits and that particularly 
reprehensible conduct deserves large punitive damages awards.  With 
legislative limits on punitive damages awards, courts will be forced to 
consider the reasonableness of the legislative determination of proportional 
punishment.  Courts will generally accept that judgment and, only in rare 
cases, reject it.  Legislative limits on punitive damages not only will make 
the proportionality analysis more rational, but they will bring the review of 
punitive damages more in line with the principles of just punishment and 
due process. 
 
